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Introduction 
The 1956 war in the Middle East started with the Sinai campaign, a surprise military attack on 
Egypt on 29 October. On the surface, Israel led the campaign, but Britain and France secretly 
backed it. In reality, the war was a result of a French-British-Israeli conspiracy to oust the 
Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. In July 1956 Nasser had nationalised the Suez 
Canal, a strategic necessity for the colonial powers’ influence in the region. Without absolute 
access to the canal, Britain feared that its hegemony in the Middle East would end. France 
saw the Arab nationalism Nasser promoted as a threat to its own position in the region, 
notably in Algeria. Israel too had its own regional position to consider. Diminishing Egypt’s 
role and avoiding further spreading of Arab nationalism was an important incentive for Israel 
to go to war.1
The secret allies’ military success in the war was imminent; within days Israel 
controlled Sinai and Gaza, while France and Britain again controlled the Suez Canal. 
However, the occupation was to be short-lived, largely because of pressure from the 
superpowers, particularly from the US administration. The United States had not been 
informed of the plot against Egypt, and was taken by surprise, as it had not expected an 
invasion.
  
2 In addition, the United States did not want war in the Middle East, as the conflict 
was considered “a problem demanding a solution”.3 In order to end the 1956 war, the 
superpower was forced to choose between two evils: Either the USA would have to oppose its 
allies Britain, France and Israel; or it might face the possibility of Soviet involvement in the 
war and thus in the region.4
                                                 
1 Shlaim, Avi. 2000:169, 176-179. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. New York and London: W.W. 
Norton & Company. 
  
2 Hahn, Peter L. 2004:203. Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961. 
Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press. 
3 Hahn 2004:276. 
4 Hahn 2004:203-206. 
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US President Dwight D. Eisenhower chose to take a firm stand against the aggressors. 
First, he forced the colonial powers to back down; then Israel too had to withdraw its forces. 
In the end, there were no territorial changes, but the 1956 war still had lasting effects, 
especially in terms of a new balance of power. In many ways, the 1956 war was “[t]he 
template for the 1967 war.”5
The causes for the war in 1967 were largely the same as they had been in 1956. The 
background for the 1967 war was Arab-Israeli rivalry in the region, as it had been eleven 
years earlier. Again, actions by the Egyptian President Nasser were important triggers for the 
conflict. However, there is an ongoing discussion whether these actions unintentionally set 
forth a development that inevitably led to a war nobody wanted, or if Nasser’s actions only 
were the pretext needed by Israeli hawks who favoured war over a diplomatic solution. 
Scholar and Israeli ambassador to the United States, Michael B. Oren, describes the 1967 war 
as a war no one wanted, but several incidents – notably those caused by Egypt – escalated the 
conflict until Israeli leaders felt forced to strike a pre-emptive attack. While many historians 
disagree that the 1967 war almost exclusively can be blamed on Nasser, there has in previous 
research largely been a consensus that the war was a result of a conflict spiral no one was able 
to control. Senior Researcher Roland Popp disputes this, arguing with backing in recently 
declassified archive material that the military leadership in Israel believed a diplomatic 
solution would not favour Israel, and thus convinced the civil leaders that a military strike was 
the best option for the Jewish state.
  
6
Regardless of the participants’ intentions, it remains a fact that the conflict turned to 
war on 5 June 1967. In the weeks prior to the outbreak of war, Egypt evicted the United 
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from the Sinai Peninsula, and followed this move by 
transporting a significant amount of Egyptian troops there. Finally, Egypt closed the Straits of 
Tiran to Israeli shipping in May 1967. Since the access to the Straits of Tiran was Israel’s 
main military gain of the 1956 war, the closing of them was particularly objectionable to the 
Israelis. Even before this, however, Israel was preparing for war and making public threats to 
Syria.
 
7
The 1967 war, like that in 1956, started with a highly successful Israeli surprise attack. 
Within hours of the first day of the war, Israel had destroyed the Egyptian air force. Later the 
  
                                                 
5 Woollacott, Martin. 2006:6. After Suez: Adrift in the American Century. London and New York: I.B. Tauris. 
6 Oren, Michael B. 2002:32, 92-126. Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. 
New York: Oxford University Press; Shlaim 2000:236-241; Popp, Roland. 2006:296-298. “Stumbling Decidedly 
into the Six-Day War” in Middle East Journal, vol. 60, no. 2, spring 2006.  
7 Shlaim 2000:236-237; Popp 2006:284-285. 
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same day, Israel also wiped out the air forces of Syria and Jordan, and a significant part of the 
Iraqi air force.8
The war lasted for six days. At the end of the sixth day, Israel controlled the Sinai 
Peninsula; Gaza; the West Bank, with the old city of Jerusalem; and the Golan Heights. 
Unlike in the aftermath of the 1956 war, the United States did not force Israel to give up its 
territorial gains. What had changed during these years that made the United States transform 
their policy towards the ongoing conflict? Was it a result of a change in internal and external 
circumstances; a conscious choice made by the US administrations in question; or a 
combination? Most importantly, why did the United States not attempt to solve the Arab-
Israeli conflict in the Middle East by initiating a comprehensive peace negotiation between 
the 1956 and 1967 wars, but instead allow the situation to evolve into another war, eleven 
years later?  
  
“United States objectives are best served by peace, political stability and 
economic and social progress in the Middle East.”9
For more than sixty years, one of the major concerns in international relations has been the 
difficulty of creating peace and stability in the Middle East. This has been a foreign policy 
goal of all the US governments since World War Two, yet none has proved capable of 
creating a lasting, comprehensive peace in the volatile region. One of the central formative 
eras for the modern Middle East was between the two wars in 1956 and 1967. This was also 
one of the essential epochs for forming US policy towards the region, illustrated by the 
significantly different approaches US authorities had to the two wars.  
 
All three administrations had one basic idea in common: stability in the Middle East 
was desirable for the United States, and the US needed to take the necessary means to ensure 
such stability. However, the means to achieve this shifted throughout the period. One possible 
explanation as to why the US did not initiate a peace process after 1956 is that they had other 
commitments. It was in their interest to obtain a stable balance of power in the Middle East, 
but not necessarily peace. The objective was that no Middle Eastern state or the Soviet Union, 
would gain a hegemonic status, which would affect US political, economical and strategic 
interests. The initiatives the US took between the 1956 war and the new outbreak in 1967 
were meant to avoid war, but not necessarily to create peace.  
                                                 
8 Shlaim 2000:241. 
9 Memorandum for the President, 21 November 1956, CDF 1955-1959, box 2548. 
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In order to answer the above-posed research questions, it will be essential to take a 
closer look at the main shaping force of US foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s: the Cold 
War framework. The Cold War demanded attention and resources from the United States. 
Increasingly between 1956 and 1967, the US became engaged in wars and strategic combat 
operations around the world, most notably the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam 
War.10
There appear to be no serious or successful US attempts at creating a lasting 
comprehensive peace in the Middle East between 1956 and 1967. Before discussing why the 
US did not take such measures it is pertinent to clarify why it should, or perhaps more 
accurately, why it would want to. The Americans saw it as being in their interest to involve 
themselves in these conflicts, and they saw it as their interest to maintain stability in the 
situation in the Middle East. The recurring goal throughout the period was to keep the Soviet 
Union out of the Middle East. Containment of communism was a global aspiration for the US 
during the Cold War, and the Middle East was considered a particularly dangerous playing 
field because of the lingering instability in the region. By creating peace, the Americans 
hoped to keep communism at bay.
 These and other incidents prevented the US administrations from focusing on the 
Middle East. However, the Cold War was also part of the driving force for the US policy in 
the Middle East. The potential threat of the Soviet Union was at the centre of US foreign 
policy making throughout the Cold War, and the Soviet Union’s attempt at establishing a base 
of support in the Middle East was perceived as a considerable problem for the United States.  
11
Especially in Syria, the Americans suspected that the Soviet Union attempted to gain 
control, for instance by supplying Syria with arms.
 
12 The Soviet Union also supplied Egypt 
and Iraq with financial aid and weapons. This conduct built up under American suspicions of 
the Soviet Union’s intentions in the Middle East. However, it can be argued that the Western 
fear of Soviet influence in the Middle East generally, and in Egypt specifically, was 
exaggerated. The Soviet Union failed to make any Eastern Europe-style puppet states, and the 
relationship between Nasser and the Kremlin was at times strained; for instance, when Nasser 
illegalized the Egyptian Communist Party.13
                                                 
10 For an account of the US interventions and engagements during the Cold War, see Lundestad, Geir. 1999. 
”’Empire by Invitation’ in the American Century” in Diplomatic History, vol. 23. 2/1999. 
 It also seems evident in retrospect that Nasser 
11 Hahn 2004:1. 
12 Shlaim 2000:190. 
13 Petersen, Tore T. 2006:12-13. The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East 1961-1969: A Willing Retreat. 
Brighton/Portland: Sussex Academic Press.  
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and other actors in the region consciously tried to use the American fear of Soviet expansion 
in the Middle East to influence the direction of US policy.14
As peace proved elusive, however, the US policy towards active peacemaking 
changed. If forced to choose, the US government picked containment over peace. US 
hegemony over a volatile Middle East was preferable to a peaceful, but potentially communist 
region. Thus, US interests no longer were in accordance with comprehensive peacemaking. 
Because the Cold War was more important than peace in the Middle East, the Eisenhower 
administration did not hesitate to sacrifice comprehensive peace for its own Cold War aims 
when the two conflicted.
  
15
Similarly, the relationship between the US and Israel developed, again largely as a 
result of US Cold War aims. It became useful for the US to have a friend and ally in the 
Middle East. However, the relationship between Israel and the US was not altogether good 
throughout this period. Eisenhower was considered by many to be less Israel-friendly than his 
predecessor, and subsequent history has shown him as less Israel-friendly than any later US 
presidents. Among the issues straining the relationship between Israel and the US were the 
US’s even-handed policy towards the protagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict; Eisenhower’s 
refusal to accept the Israeli occupation of Egyptian territory after the 1956 war; and the 
consequent refusal by the Eisenhower administration to directly sell weapons to Israel.
  
16
Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford, Avi Shlaim, argues 
that there are three main reasons why the Eisenhower administration refused to supply Israel 
with sophisticated arms. First, the US wanted to keep the military balance stable, and they 
already considered Israel the strongest actor in the region. Secondly, the US administration 
wanted Arab political support in their containment against the Soviet Union. Finally, there 
was an economic reason: the US did not want to estrange themselves from the Arabs because 
of their oil.
  
17 The worry was that if the Soviet Union got control over the Middle Eastern oil 
pipelines, the most important US allies – Western Europe – would be immobilized.18
                                                 
14 Petersen 2006:33; Summit, April R. 2008:1. John F. Kennedy and U.S.-Middle East Relations: A History of 
American Foreign Policy in the 1960s. Lewiston, Queenston and Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press. 
 The 
common denominator was US interests. The reasoning behind the refusal to sell arms to Israel 
and behind the policy of even-handedness was the same; an overly strong Israel was not 
consistent with US interests, according to the Eisenhower administration.  
15 Hahn 2004:1-2, 277-279. 
16 Hahn 2004:261-264, 288-289. 
17 Shlaim 2000:189. 
18 Memorandum of conversation by Russell, 17 April 1956, CDF 1955-1959, box 2548. 
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However, after Eisenhower, certain of these premises changed. Israel’s position in US 
policy was subject to a gradual change – from being a bothersome acquaintance, Israel was 
considered a useful friend. The second issue, containing the Soviet Union, became less 
important as the Soviet attempts to gain Arab support proved less successful than Washington 
feared. And finally, on the issue of oil, by the 1960s the United States had established a base 
of support in a few countries that did not mind their relationship with Israel as much – 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iraq now accepted Israel as a “historical fact”.19
During and after Eisenhower’s presidency, there was also a gradual shift in US policy 
from comprehensive peacemaking to a more step-by-step approach to certain selected 
subjects. In chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, two such examples are shown, analysing the US 
attempts to tackle the conflict from the development of the Jordan waters and the Palestinian 
refugee problem. The main reason comprehensive peacemaking was abandoned is that the US 
government increasingly believed the leaders of the Middle Eastern states were unwilling to 
compromise and find a settlement in the deadlocked conflict. There was little point for the 
Americans to commit to finding a solution as long as they were convinced it would fail.
 This way the US 
oil supply was less threatened by its alliance with Israel than it had been earlier, and it opened 
the possibility of moving away from Eisenhower’s policy of even-handedness.  
20
The Ripeness of a Conflict 
  
The ripeness of a conflict is one of the elements which determine the potential success of the 
outcome of any negotiation. “[T]he ripeness of conflicts refers to a particular moment in the 
course of a dispute when circumstances are most conducive to conflict management by an 
outside actor.”21 According to this theory, a conflict has a certain point where it is at its most 
“ripe” for achieving a solution. Crucial elements to such ripeness are that all the involved 
actors consider a peaceful solution in their best interest, and that they are open to the idea of 
working towards it.22
The ripeness will depend on the military situation between the actors in the conflict, 
and their perception of it. Proponents of ripeness theory maintain that if there is a mutually 
hurting stalemate, where neither actor is able to solve the situation with unilateral solutions, 
  
                                                 
19 Hahn 2004:271-272. 
20 Working Paper to Airlie House discussions 12-14 June 1964, Records relating to Israel and Arab-Israel 
Affairs: 1951-1976, box 20. 
21 Kleiboer, Marieke. 1994:110. ”Ripeness of a Conflict: A Fruitful Notion?” in Journal of Peace Research, vol. 
31, no. 1, February 1994.  
22 Waage, Hilde Henriksen. 2000:10. ”Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?”: Explaining the Oslo Back 
Channel: Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East, Oslo: The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
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there is a greater opportunity for a successful third party negotiation. The actors in the conflict 
also have to believe that bilateral or multilateral solutions are possible and necessary, and they 
have to be able to take the required steps to achieve such agreement.23
Several attempts of finding a decisive definition for ripeness have been made, and for 
theoretical purposes these are useful. In actual conflict resolution, however, the problem is 
that the recognition of a “ripe” moment is not all that simple. It may even be recognized only 
after it has passed.
  
24
Lack of ripeness was definitely part of the argumentation for why comprehensive 
peace initiatives were not pursued by the US after the 1956 war. The Eisenhower, Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations all avoided committing to comprehensive peace initiatives, 
believing that these would not be successful in the political climate in the Middle East. 
However, using ripeness as a way of making political decisions constitutes a considerable 
problem: how and when would the conflict become ripe? How would this be determined? 
Instead, the US administrations in the period explored a series of more or less successful 
initiatives attempting to create peace with a much smaller scope, such as the efforts to solve 
the Palestinian refugee problem or water sharing initiatives. The belief that the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was not ripe for negotiation was part of the reasoning behind the US decision to 
engage in these piecemeal alternatives instead of exploring the possibility of achieving 
comprehensive peace between 1956 and 1967. 
 In the Arab-Israeli conflict there are several moments that in retrospect 
have been considered occasions when peace could have been sought. The period of relative 
calm between 1956 and 1967 may have been such an occasion, but the most likely outside 
mediator, the United States, chose not to venture into any efforts for negotiating 
comprehensive peace in this period.  
One danger which it is important to be aware of is that a conclusion regarding the 
ripeness of a potential mediation might provide convenient “excuses” for not just a failed 
negotiation, but for avoiding negotiation entirely. The US government claimed that it wanted 
peace in the Middle East, but it did not actively go about trying to achieve this in the period in 
question. The lack of ripeness of the conflict may be a reason. But research reveals that other 
options also affected the decision. For instance, the desire to achieve peace was secondary to 
other interests, such as stalling Soviet influence in the Middle East; limiting Arab nationalism; 
and consolidating Israel as a friend and eventually an ally. Thus it is relevant to also consider 
                                                 
23 Kleiboer 1994:110-111. 
24 Kleiboer 1994:111. Kleiboer reviews the definitions by Richard N. Haass, Stephen J. Steadman and William 
Zartman in her paper.  
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the willingness of the US government to negotiate peace. Because the ripeness of a conflict is 
dependent upon the subjective perceptions of its actors it is ultimately also dependent upon 
their unconditional willingness to participate in negotiations. Since the US government lacked 
this willingness, the conflict was never ripe for negotiation.25
Since the ripeness is defined partly by the actors’ willingness to participate, there is 
considerable opportunity for affecting if and when ripeness will occur. Ripeness will not 
necessarily “fall into one’s hand”.
  
26 An active mediator can create a ripe moment in a 
conflict. In order to do so, however, the mediator needs leverage.27 In the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, the US is commonly considered to have leverage, particularly over Israel. But how 
much leverage did the US really have? After the 1956 war, one of the few times in US-Israeli 
history Israel has changed its policy in accordance with US wishes, the US actually went a 
long way in accommodating Israel, and the policy change came as a result of other countries’ 
pressure as well as that from the United States.28
A core concern of the ripeness theory is that if the conditions are not ripe, then 
mediation might make things worse. The advice to the potential mediator is to step down and 
not force through diplomatic activity that may lead to a detriment of the conflict rather than 
improvement. However, the alternative is not to do nothing, but rather to try other means, 
such as selective military assistance, security guarantees or other commitments. Often, a 
conflict is rarely ripe in its entirety, though elements of it can be.
  
29
It may be argued that a conflict is not ripe as long as the actors are not convinced that 
it is. And perhaps in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1956 and 1967, the fact that 
the Americans did not think the conflict was ripe was as important to their failure in solving it 
as an actual lack of ripeness in the conflict.  
 In a way, it was by this 
logic that US authorities after 1956 chose to pursue specific parts of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
rather than to work towards an overall settlement. The question remains, however, if their 
decision to do so was a result of a lack of willingness to act, or if the circumstances made 
comprehensive peace unapproachable.  
                                                 
25 Kleiboer 1994:115. 
26 Kleiboer 1994:111, quoting Zartman.  
27 Kleiboer 1994:111-112.  
28 A discussion of the US pressure applied to force Israel to withdraw after the 1956 war can be found in Chapter 
3 of this thesis.  
29 Haass, Richard N. 1988:246-247. ”Ripeness and the settlement of international disputes” in Survival, 30:3.  
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Methods and Source Material 
There has been considerable amounts of research within this field, but often these are either 
works that describe US policy or Middle Eastern history within a much longer time frame and 
thus cannot go into specifics in this period;30 or they singularly aim to cover either the 1956 
war or the 1967 war.31
Professor of History Peter L. Hahn’s Caught in the Middle East covers US policy 
towards the conflict in the Middle East between 1945 and 1961.
 Although both these approaches are extremely valuable, I believe it 
will be an important contribution to the research already done to see the 1956-1967 period as 
a unit, because of the shaping forces that took place.  
32 I will draw on his work, but 
also consider the implications of adding six extra years that will allow me to see the 
connection between the two previously mentioned wars. For the Kennedy era, one notable 
contribution is Assistant Professor April Summitt’s John F. Kennedy and U.S.-Middle East 
Relations.33 Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency has not been considered as one with much focus 
on the Middle East, but accounts of the Johnson administration’s policy in the region can be 
found in Professor of International and American Diplomatic History Tore T. Petersen’s The 
Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East 1961-1969, and in Warren I. Cohen and Nancy 
Bernkopf Tucker’s Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World.34
For the purpose of answering my research questions, I have consulted several primary 
sources. The first and by far most exhaustive were the US State Department archives. I visited 
the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) at College Park, Maryland where 
I examined records relating to US foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the 
countries and issues related to this, in the period 1956 to 1967. These records consist of 
memos, telegrams, internal and external correspondence in the US State Department in the 
 
                                                 
30 Spiegel, Stephen L. 1985. The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from 
Truman to Reagan. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press; Neff, Donald. 1995. Fallen Pillars: 
US Policy towards Palestine and Israel since 1945. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies; Little, 
Douglas. 2002. American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945. Chapel Hill and 
London: The University of North Carolina Press; Shlaim, Avi. 2000. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. 
New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company. 
31 Kyle, Keith. 2003. Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East. London and New York: I.B. Tauris; 
Louis, WM, Roger and Roger Owen (ed.). 1989. Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press; Oren, Michael B. 2002. Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle 
East. New York: Oxford University Press.  
32 Hahn, Peter L. 2004. Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961. 
Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press.  
33 Summit, April R. 2008. John F. Kennedy and U.S.-Middle East Relations: A History of American Foreign 
Policy in the 1960s. Lewiston, Queenston and Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press.  
34 Petersen, Tore T. 2006. The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East 1961-1969: A Willing Retreat. 
Brighton/Portland: Sussex Academic Press; Cohen, Warren I. and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (ed.). 1994. Lyndon 
Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy 1963-1968. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
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period. In addition, I have had great use of the source collection Foreign Relations of the 
United States, FRUS, which is available both in printed and online form. I have also consulted 
other online sources, for instance UN resolutions, available through the United Nations 
website.  
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Storm Before the Quiet: US policy towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict 1945-1956 
The United States was the first country in the world to recognize the State of Israel, on the 
very same day as the Jewish state was proclaimed on 14 May 1948. The relationship with 
Israel and Israel’s predominantly Arab neighbour states became an important factor around 
which US authorities were forced to shape their Middle East policy. In addition, there were 
other international actors who demanded a say in the region, most notably the United 
Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United Nations.  
After the First World War, the areas on both sides of the Jordan River, Palestine and 
Transjordan, became British mandate areas. The task of managing these areas was not an easy 
one, especially considering the numerous conflicts the local Arabs had both with each other 
and with the growing number of Jewish settlers seeking to enforce the dream of establishing a 
Jewish state in Palestine. After 1945, the revelation of the horrors of the Holocaust gave great 
weight to the Jewish demand for a state of their own. Britain, however, had numerous 
obligations to the Arabs already living in the Middle East. Transjordan had become an emirate 
under British protection in 1921, and gained independence in 1946. The question of Palestine 
remained problematic for decades to come.35
President Harry S Truman’s administration was divided on the Palestine question. 
Central officials in the State and Defense Departments as well as in the intelligence 
community were sceptical towards US support for the establishment of a Jewish state. They 
worried this would alienate the Arabs which in turn could interfere with US interests in the 
region. However, influential members of the White House staff were actively working for 
establishing a Jewish state, and they eventually gained President Truman’s support.
  
36
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Holocaust survivors in Europe and made recommendations for future US policy, Truman 
advised the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, to allow 100 000 Jewish refugees into 
Palestine, in accordance with the recommendations from Harrison’s report.37 This conflicted 
with the 1939 White Paper issued by British authorities that had limited Jewish immigration 
to Palestine to 15 000 a year. The White Paper also granted the Arabs the right to deny further 
Jewish immigration to the area after a five-year long period of the above mentioned 
immigration schedule.38 Ignoring British reluctance to abandon the White Paper policy, 
Truman chose to go public with the 100 000 recommendation, mainly to serve domestic 
election purposes. This move angered the British, the Arabs, and Truman’s own State 
Department.39
In response to Truman’s public announcement, the British Foreign Secretary Ernest 
Bevin proposed to the United States that the two Western powers joined together in an 
“Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine” 
(AACOI). After six months the committee concluded that Britain should admit the suggested 
100 000 Jewish refugees into Palestine, but it advised against the establishment of both a 
Jewish and an Arab state. Instead the committee suggested that Palestine should be governed 
by a UN trusteeship once the British mandate expired.
  
40
Although neither of the governments adopted the AACOI report as policy, Truman 
again chose to publicly support the suggestion of admitting 100 000 refugees, while the 
British stressed the necessity for considering the report as a whole and not singling out certain 
issues.
  
41 Despite this, the cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom, 
though somewhat strained, continued throughout the spring and summer of 1946. It 
culminated in July when the two countries proceeded to promote the Morrison-Grady plan. 
This plan, developed by negotiating teams from the US and Britain, proposed a British-
governed, US-funded Palestine divided into four districts that within certain issues would be 
self-governed.42
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38 ”British White Paper of 1939 on Palestine”, available through the Avalon Project. 
39 Neff 1995:31-32; Hahn 2004:33. 
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1946, printed in Department of State Bulletin, vol. 14, no. 358, 12 May 1946:783. 
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the British military headquarters in Jerusalem. The population of Palestine also opposed the 
plan. The Palestinians demanded that their majority status be taken into consideration. The 
Jews, who had complained that the Morrison-Grady plan would make another Jewish 
“ghetto”, were united in discarding the plan, but divided in their alternatives. While the 
extremists were taking matters into their own hands, the more moderate leaders of the Zionist 
movement proposed a two-state solution. Truman, though not completely endorsing the idea 
of separate Jewish and Arab states in Palestine, made a speech on Yom Kippur on 4 October 
1946, which was immediately interpreted as support for partition and the creation of an 
independent Jewish state.43
The Birth of a New State 
 
The British found themselves unable to establish a political solution in Palestine that was 
acceptable for both the Arabs and the Jews. Faced with terrorist attacks, rebellions and 
demands for independence, the British concluded that the strategic advantage of controlling 
Palestine did not justify the costs.44 The British government decided to hand the problem over 
to the United Nations in February 1947, which appointed a committee to deal with Palestine. 
The majority of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) 
recommended partition into one Jewish and one Arab state, while Jerusalem would be an 
international zone.45
The US government agencies were as divided as ever. The White House supported 
partition, while State Department still argued heavily against UNSCOP’s proposal. The main 
reason was that the State Department officials feared that the US involvement in the Middle 
East would increase significantly because it did not appear that the other great powers were 
prepared to implement the provisions decided by UNSCOP. However, Truman remained set 
on establishing a Jewish state, and he thus discarded the State Department’s worries.
  
46 When 
UNSCOP’s recommendation was adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947, 
the US delegation supported the partition plan for Palestine, and the resolution was passed.47
                                                 
43 Neff 1995:41-42. 
 
The British mandate was scheduled to end on 15 May 1948, and both the US and the rest of 
44 Hahn 2004:23. 
45 Yapp 1991: 136; Memorandum by Gross to Lovett, 13 May 1948, FRUS 1948, 5: 961. 
46 Neff 1995: 45-47; Excerpts From the Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the 
Second Session of the General Assembly, 15 September 1947, FRUS 1947, 5:1150. 
47 UN A/RES/181(II), 29 November 1947.  
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the world prepared for the likelihood that one or two new states might be proclaimed in the 
Middle East immediately after this.48
Following the resolution in November 1947, there was considerable violence between 
the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine. This civil war turned into a regional war when 
the State of Israel was proclaimed on 14 May, and the Arab states entered the conflict by 
invading Israel. The war was formally terminated in 1949 with a series of armistice 
agreements rather than a peace treaty. The borders established in the agreements were 
radically different than those in the UN partition plan.
  
49 Israel came out of the war as the clear 
winner, while the Arab states were forced to retreat. The biggest loss, however, was suffered 
by the non-Jewish population of the new-born Jewish state, the Palestinians.50 From 1949 the 
Palestinians were merely considered as being a refugee problem.51
Mediation and Negotiation 
 
The UN appointed the Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte as UN mediator in Palestine on 20 
May 1948 in an attempt to settle the conflict. In September that year, Bernadotte concluded a 
report proposing a final settlement framework. His proposal, commonly known as the 
Bernadotte plan, was labelled as a territorial compromise. Palestine would cease to exist, the 
territory split between Israel and Jordan. Israel would keep the western Galilee, while the 
Negev would be governed by Arabs. These territorial changes reflected the military realities 
rather than the original partition plan. The Bernadotte plan also included a Jerusalem 
governed by an international regime and repatriation of Palestinian refugees in Israel. 
However, Bernadotte’s involvement proved fatal, as he was assassinated by the Jewish 
terrorist group the Stern Gang on 17 September 1948, the day after his report was presented to 
the UN.52
The US State Department, who had given Bernadotte’s report its full support, 
continued promoting his settlement proposals, hoping to draw on sympathies arising after his 
death. While the State Department saw the opportunity to work towards a settlement within 
the Bernadotte framework, the White House was largely preoccupied with the 1948 election 
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campaign. In addition to occupying the President’s time and attention, the upcoming election 
also limited his ability to spend time on foreign policy due to an understanding between the 
two presidential candidates that neither of them would campaign on foreign policy issues 
because of the Berlin blockade that dominated US foreign affairs. Truman’s opponent, 
Governor Thomas E. Dewey, broke this understanding when he attacked the support the 
Truman administration had given the Bernadotte plan. As a result Truman thought it 
appropriate to bring foreign policy back into the campaign, and he thus released a statement 
reaffirming his support for Israel’s right to veto border changes, a part of the Democratic 
Party platform.53 The difficulty of maintaining a consistent policy when there was a never-
ending tug-of-war between the departments in the US administration was substantial. The 
State Department attempted to alter the Bernadotte plan’s territorial provisions in a way that 
would be more consistent with Truman’s promise to Israel.54
A further problem was that neither the Arabs nor the Israelis supported the Bernadotte 
plan. The Arabs disapproved because the plan implied a continued Jewish state, while the 
Israelis reacted to the portion of the plan that demanded Israel to give up the Negev.
 However, this attempt did not 
bear fruit. By November, the United States no longer supported the Bernadotte plan.  
55 As a 
whole, the Bernadotte plan was as dead by September 1948 as the mediator himself. 
However, some of the ideas from the plan lived on. One of them materialized in December, 
when the UN established the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) to replace the UN 
mediator, as had been suggested by Bernadotte. The commission had members from France, 
Turkey and the United States, and from then on the Truman administration’s involvement in 
the Middle Eastern conflict had to focus on US membership in the PCC.56
The aim of the PCC was to make permanent peace out of the armistice agreements that 
formally had ended the war. In order to achieve that goal, the PCC held a peace conference 
with representatives from the Arab countries and Israel at Lausanne in Switzerland in 1949. 
One of the most important issues discussed there was the question of who was responsible for 
the Palestinian refugees. The difference of opinion was massive. From the Israeli point of 
view, the Arabs were entirely responsible for the refugees, because they had started the war, 
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and thus created the problem. The Arab official position, on the other hand, was the complete 
opposite: The Israelis were responsible for the refugees, because they were to blame for the 
Palestinian exodus.57
Similarly, the parties held diametrically opposed positions on the territorial issue. 
Israel, the victor of the war, wanted to base territorial negotiations on the armistice lines. 
These far exceeded the borders suggested by any of the plans so far proposed, but reflected 
the status quo that much favoured Israel. The Arabs could not accept the status quo. They 
wanted the negotiations for permanent borders based on the 1947 UN Partition plan. This was 
not a very realistic alternative under the circumstances, since Israel due to her success in the 
war controlled a substantial amount of areas the Arabs wanted redistributed.
 These irreconcilable positions made negotiations and compromises 
extremely difficult.  
58
Another reason why the Lausanne conference did not produce any significant results 
was that the parties also disagreed on the form of negotiations. Israel wanted direct, bilateral 
negotiations with each of the Arab states involved. This was not something the PCC could 
offer, as the Arab delegations had joined forces and approached the conference with a 
coordinated policy as the Arab League.
  
59 Despite these unfortunate circumstances, the PCC 
kept trying to make peace. The American members of the PCC were putting pressure onto 
Israel in order to force the Israelis make concessions to the Arab states. Nevertheless, very 
little was achieved. The Lausanne conference more and more began to look like a failure, a 
clear indication that the UN had not managed to create a settlement on the many issues it had 
strived to solve. In short, Lausanne failed to make comprehensive peace.60
After Lausanne, the PCC seemed to have lost its momentum. Further undermining the 
PCC was the Tripartite Declaration of 25 May 1950. The intention of the Tripartite 
Declaration was to regulate the arms supply in the Middle East. This had become an issue 
after the abolishment of the arms embargo that regulated the weapon supply during the 1948 
war. The declaration affirmed US responsibility for Middle Eastern security as it included a 
clause that the three governments issuing it, Great Britain, France and the US, would take 
action to prevent violation of armistice lines or the borders that were the result of the 1948 
war.
  
61
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Declaration was an attempt to “establish peace and preserve the status quo”.62 Problematic for 
the PCC, however, was exactly this – preserving the status quo was the opposite of PCC’s 
task of negotiating a territorial settlement. Since both France and the US were members of the 
PCC, a dissenting declaration from their own governments undeniably must have been a 
considerable disappointment.63
After the Tripartite Declaration and for the remainder of his presidency, Truman’s 
attention was rarely focused on the Middle East. The outbreak of hostilities in Korea and the 
subsequent US invasion in June 1950 dominated the foreign political agenda for the next three 
years. The troublesome involvement in the Korean War is a considerable part of why the US 
administration did not commit itself to creating peace in the Middle East until Dwight D. 
Eisenhower took office in 1953. In the meantime the main headache in the Middle East was 
caused by several border incidents along the Jordan River.  
  
Water and Territory 
The Jordan River runs from the north of Israel through the Huleh valley, into Lake Tiberias 
and south to the Dead Sea.64 It is one of the main fresh water sources for Israel and its 
neighbours, and it has been one of the central dividing lines between the Middle Eastern 
countries in the various border arrangements throughout history. The Jordan River was also a 
dividing line in the conflicts between Arabs and Jews both before and after the establishment 
of Israel in 1948. The dispute raised the attention of President Truman’s administration in 
1949-52.65
In the beginning of 1951 Israel started draining marshland north of Lake Huleh in 
order to lower the water level in the lake, and to straighten the riverbank south of the lake. 
The expected result of this was to expand the agricultural potential in the area, while an 
adverse effect was that the irrigation project required flooding of areas owned and inhabited 
by Palestinians. Furthermore, part of the work took place in one of the demilitarized zones 
(DMZ) which were established in the armistice agreement between Syria and Israel of 20 July 
1949. However, questions regarding sovereignty within the DMZ and rights to use the zone 
remained somewhat unclear in the text of the agreement. There was an independent 
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commission, the Syrian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) responsible for DMZ 
matters. Consequently, Syria complained to the MAC, which ruled in favour of Syria: Israel 
did not have sovereign rights to the area. Israel, however, disregarded the ruling, boycotted 
the MAC meetings and went on with a forced evacuation of several Palestinian villages in the 
DMZ.66
US authorities eventually decided to bring pressure to bear on Israel to withdraw from 
the DMZ and to respect the MAC ruling. Worried that the tense situation might escalate into 
another war, the Americans also drafted a UN Security Council resolution against the Israeli 
actions. Still, the unrest continued throughout the spring of 1951, reaching a climax with an 
eight day long battle in May. The Security Council passed a ceasefire resolution on 8 May 
1951, but while the parties put down their weapons they were blaming each other for igniting 
the violence.
 
67 US authorities continued their work in the Security Council. Despite Israeli 
pressure to avoid this, another resolution was passed on 18 May demanding that Israel stop 
the construction in the DMZ and that the Palestinians would be allowed to return to their 
homes.68
Such a firm US position against Israel had been quite unique in American Middle East 
policy since 1948, and it seems slightly uncharacteristic of Truman’s administration. Why US 
authorities chose to stand up to Israeli pressure and promote the resolution remains unclear.
 
69 
However, the importance of this position can be questioned as the Americans quickly re-
earned Israel’s trust and Arab mistrust by approving further Israeli drainage work under the 
conditions that Arab-owned land was not affected. Although violence was halted, the dispute 
regarding the DMZ sovereignty including water rights continued.70
In 1953, Israel began the work on another project that was to have serious implications 
on the relationship with its neighbours. The purpose of this project was to divert water from 
the Jordan River to the Negev Desert. However, the same problem as with the Huleh-project 
persisted – much of the work was supposed to take place in the DMZ between Israel and 
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Syria.71 Further south, Jordan was considering an irrigation project of its own: a dam on the 
Yarmouk River, on the southern boundary of the Golan Heights. However, the new US 
administration had other plans. When President Eisenhower took office in 1953, he was 
determined to solve the dispute. As opposed to Truman, Eisenhower had a close cooperation 
with the Department of State, headed by John Foster Dulles. Together with Secretary Dulles, 
Eisenhower saw the water controversy as both a problem and an opportunity to solve some of 
the major questions in the overall Arab-Israeli conflict. The Bureau of Near Eastern, South 
Asian and African Affairs (NEA) had through American engineers come up with an 
alternative plan that would ensure water supply for both Israel and Jordan, and thus make the 
unilateral projects superfluous. The NEA project would also enable resettlement of some 
400 000 Palestinian refugees in Jordan. The problem with the plan, however, was that it 
required concessions from both Israel and Jordan. Israel refused to let Jordan access Lake 
Tiberias, while Jordan refused to publicly negotiate with Israel at all, as was the official policy 
of the Arab states at the time.72
In the absence of any agreement, Israel started digging a canal at Banat Yaacov in the 
DMZ on 2 September 1953. As could be expected, Syria protested. Again, the Syrians 
claimed that Israel’s work was in conflict with the 1949 armistice lines, that it violated the 
rights of the Palestinian landowners, and the Syrians were especially worried that it gained 
Israel a military advantage.
  
73 US authorities had been about to allocate economic aid to Israel 
when they learned about the unilateral Israeli irrigation project. The Eisenhower 
administration decided not to release the funds to Israel until the Banat Yaacov matter was 
resolved.74 Chief of staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 
Vagn Bennike, who also was chairman of the MAC, sent a letter to the Israeli government on 
23 September, requesting that Israel gave up the work in the DMZ. Israel did not bow to this. 
On the contrary, the irrigation work was speeded up. US officials continued withholding 
funds, as a reaction to the Jewish state’s refusal to comply with Bennike’s decision.75 The 
Banat Yaacov controversy was also brought before the Security Council, but this time the 
Council failed to pass a resolution.76
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Further increasing the conflict level was one of the most serious border incidents yet. 
On the night of 14 October 1953, Israeli soldiers partly belonging to the newly formed Unit 
101 attacked the Arab village Qibya in the West Bank, which at the time was Jordanian 
territory, killing and wounding a large number of civilians, demolishing homes and firing at 
two nearby villages also on Jordanian territory in order to avoid the arrival of Jordanian 
soldiers.77 The attack was a retaliation for the murder of an Israeli woman and two children 
performed by alleged Jordanian infiltrators that had crossed the Israeli border on the previous 
night. However, the retaliation was not proportionate to the original aggression.78 The Qibya 
incident followed other recent Israeli actions that their neighbours perceived as threats – in 
addition to the diversion attempts of the Jordan River and work in the DMZ, Israel had 
recently moved their Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem.79
Israel was internationally condemned after the Qibya incident. The UN Security 
Council held a session of meetings on the incident starting 19 October. In Resolution 101 of 
24 November, the retaliatory action at Qibya was declared a violation of the 1948 ceasefire 
and the 1949 General Armistice Agreement. In addition, the Security Council expressed “the 
strongest censure” [their italics] of the incident, and it called upon Israel to prevent such 
actions in the future.
  
80 The US government was also infuriated. The US decision to withhold 
funds to Israel as a result of the Banat Yaacov controversy was thus publicly announced in a 
press conference on 20 October 1953.81 Despite the outcry against Israel after the Qibya 
incident, however, the domestic reaction to the US sanctions against Israel was very negative. 
Consequently, Dulles and Eisenhower decided to change the tactic with regards to the US 
involvement in the water sharing problems in the Middle East.82
The Security Council resolved that Israel should stop the work on the canal in a 
resolution on 27 October 1953.
 
83
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that the aid now would be released, which in turn angered the Arabs.84
The Johnston Plan 
 The conflict over how 
to best use the scarce water resources was not yet over.  
On 7 October 1953, Eisenhower appointed Eric Johnston as his personal representative and 
ambassador to the Middle East.85 Johnston’s overall task was to help create peace in the 
region, while one of the specific goals was the promotion of a project called the Jordan Valley 
Plan (JVP), popularly known as the Johnston plan.86 A unified plan for usage of the Jordan 
River was not a new idea – already in January 1945 there were suggestions for a Jordan 
Valley Authority modelled on the successful Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).87 Similarly, 
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA) had commissioned a unified plan for the Jordan River. The idea was revisited after 
Dulles’ tour in the Middle East in June 1953, after which he spoke warmly of irrigation 
projects to solve refugee problems in the area.88 The plan Johnston promoted from the autumn 
of 1953 until the spring of 1955 was specifically aimed at maximizing the water resources for 
all the Middle Eastern states, and for using this in the benefit of refugee relief projects.89
Johnston faced substantial obstacles. His assignment got off to a bad start with the 
Banat Yaacov controversy and the Qibya raid. The climate for cooperation and peace-making 
was hardly ideal when Johnston landed in Beirut on 22 October 1953. In addition to this, 
several of the Arab states took offence to the fact that Johnston was a member of the pro-
Zionist American Christian Palestine Committee.
 The 
goal was thus to include several elements in one settlement, although the Johnston plan did 
not aspire to be a comprehensive peace initiative.   
90
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foundation for at the time.91 This strategy seemed efficient, as Johnston during his first visit to 
the region had already managed to convince both Arab and Israeli leaders to accept one of the 
keys to further progress: the principle of unified development of the Jordan River valley. 
Building on this, Johnston’s following visits earned reassurances that the Middle Eastern 
states would agree on storing water in Lake Tiberias, and eventually Johnston managed to 
land a tentative agreement supported by Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt, which was to be 
further negotiated with Israel.92
However, the Israelis had already begun to change their mind regarding the shared 
usage of Lake Tiberias, and after three days of negotiations, Johnston only managed to get the 
Israeli government to agree to terms so unfavourable that he believed the Arabs would not 
accept them.
  
93 This hypothesis was never tested as the Arab states withdrew their support to 
the Johnston plan, largely as a reaction to Israel’s Gaza raid on 28 February 1955.94 Thus, the 
Johnston plan was rejected. It had been presented in several versions to the Middle Eastern 
states, but Johnston did not manage to find an alternative that was acceptable for both sides. 
According to Eisenhower, Johnston’s mission failed to create a long-lasting difference 
because of “prejudice and resentments on both sides” in the conflict.95 Even though the 
Johnston plan repeatedly ran into obstacles, Eric Johnston himself did not lose faith that a 
settlement could be reached.96 However, the American leaders had given up on the Johnston 
plan, and gradually let it fade away. Instead they promoted the initially top secret Alpha 
plan.97 By the time of yet another Israeli attempt to unilaterally divert water from the Jordan 
River in 1956 – although this time under limitations imposed by the Johnston plan – any 
hopes of getting the parties to formally commit to the plan were long gone.98
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The Alpha Plan 
Eisenhower and Dulles, together with Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister of Britain, 
Anthony Eden, were the architects behind a peace plan code-named Alpha. The Alpha plan 
was initiated in 1955, after secret talks between British and US officials late in 1954. The 
terms of the Alpha plan included mutual settlement of refugees in both Israel and the Arab 
states; a termination of the Suez Canal blockade, which had been ongoing since the first Arab-
Israeli war; and certain territorial changes, among them the dividing of the DMZ.99
The US government had good reasons to promote the Alpha plan at this particular 
time. First of all, tension in the region was escalating. Britain was facing opposition both in 
Egypt and in Iran, the first as a result of a controversy over the Suez Canal, while the second 
was a matter of oil. Closely connected was that US influence in the Middle East was 
increasing, while Britain’s was decreasing, and with a stronger involvement came a stronger 
need for the Americans for creating stability. Finally, the Eisenhower administration was 
acutely aware that there were domestic reasons why time was not on their side – with a US 
presidential election coming up in 1956, a controversial issue such as the conflict in the 
Middle East preferably should be solved in due time to avoid electoral considerations 
interfering with US involvement in the settlement.
  
100
The Alpha plan was intended to “involve the solution of the principal issues between 
Israel and her Arab neighbors,” but it was considered too long a shot to immediately aim for 
“formal and comprehensive peace treaties”. The hope, though, was that the settlement 
proposed in the Alpha plan eventually would lead to formal peace.
  
101
Nasser, who at first seemed interested in the Alpha plan, changed his mind due to two 
events: the signing of the Baghdad Pact and the Gaza raid. An agreement which initially was a 
military cooperation between Turkey and Pakistan had been encouraged by the US because 
the Eisenhower administration believed in the need for a NATO-like organization in the 
Middle East.
 This hope never 
materialized, largely because the Middle Eastern states refused to accept the conditions of the 
Alpha plan.  
102
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joined the Baghdad Pact. However, US authorities kept close ties to the alliance and 
cooperated with it. Nasser’s main objection to the Baghdad Pact was that it undermined Arab 
independence, as he believed it was dictated from the West. The announcement of the 
Baghdad Pact on 24 February 1955 merely days after Dulles had informed Nasser of Alpha, 
did nothing to improve Nasser’s will to cooperate within the Alpha framework.103
What eventually caused Nasser to reject Alpha, however, was the Israeli attack on the 
Egyptian army headquarters in Gaza on 28 February. Thirty-seven Egyptian soldiers were 
killed, and another thirty-one were wounded. As with the Qibya raid two years earlier, the 
raid in Gaza was commanded by Ariel Sharon. The raid was supposed to be a retaliation for 
two minor infiltration incidents the Israelis believed were directly tied to Egyptian military 
intelligence. However, the attack and the extent of it was surprising, as the Israeli-Egyptian 
border had just enjoyed four months of quiet. The attack on Gaza was the most serious 
incident between Israel and Egypt since the armistice agreements of 1949.
  
104
It is tempting to do as officials in the US State Department did: speculate whether the 
Gaza raid was a deliberate action by the Israelis to undermine Alpha. The Israelis had been 
negative towards this initiative from the moment they learned about it.
  
105 Whether or not this 
was the case, the raid became a turning point for the worse in Egypt-Israeli relations. 
According to Nasser’s version, the Gaza raid forced him to reprioritize and focus on defence 
which eventually led to the purchase of Soviet weapons in the Czech-Egyptian arms deal of 
September 1955. As seen from Israel, however, Nasser only used the Gaza raid as an excuse 
for a turn of policy he would have made anyway.106
Either way, the increased tension between Egypt and Israel, and the fact that Egypt 
seemed to have picked the “wrong” side in the Cold War, made it impossible for the US to 
keep Alpha going much longer. Dulles made a final attempt during the autumn of 1955 by 
publishing the until-then secret plan, but there remained little hope for a solution. The final 
blow was struck at the end of 1955, when the Middle Eastern states offered unyielding and 
incompatible demands for further negotiations.
  
107
The Gamma Plan 
  
One final US attempt to solve the conflict between Israel and the Arab states before it 
escalated into another war was the Gamma plan, which was aimed at Israel and Egypt 
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specifically.108 President Eisenhower tried to repeat the relative success of sending a trusted 
mediator who in person would try to shift some ground in the worsening conflict. The Gamma 
plan was a covert mission, stretching from January to March 1956. In addition to making it 
possible for both Israel and Egypt to negotiate without losing face, the secrecy was intended 
to make it possible for a US-issued mediator to try to convince Egypt of leaving the path of 
communist sympathies the US administration feared Egypt had entered.109 Former Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Robert Anderson went to meet Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion 
and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser with the intention of negotiating and hopefully 
settling a bilateral peace treaty.110
Eisenhower had high personal regard for Robert “Bob” Anderson. He wrote in his 
diary on 11 January 1956 that Anderson was “one of the most capable men [he knew].”
  
111 
Dispatching Anderson might have been a last resort, but Eisenhower hoped that he would 
succeed in his difficult task, and that this would bring both Egypt and Israel closer to the US. 
If the conflict between the two was resolved, Eisenhower believed the United States would be 
able to supply both countries with “almost any kind of material aid”. The grim scenario, 
however, was that Israel and Egypt could end up standing on opposite sides in the Cold War, 
with the Soviet Union funding Egypt, and the US funding Israel. This was an alternative 
Eisenhower wanted to avoid at all costs, and he was willing “to do anything within reason to 
bring [Israel and Egypt] closer together”. 112
The problem was that the main reason both Nasser and Ben-Gurion agreed to receive 
Anderson was primarily that both countries needed American goodwill, and not because they 
were particularly interested in making peace. Egypt was planning a large construction project 
at the Aswan High Dam, and the project was relying on American funding. Ben-Gurion 
wanted to purchase American weapons in order to match the Czech-Egyptian arms deal.
   
113 
Neither Nasser nor Ben-Gurion seemed to believe in or even to seek peace at that time. Once 
again their positions were so far apart that the task for a mediator of bringing about some kind 
of compromise seemed virtually impossible. In the end the Gamma plan failed like its 
predecessors, mainly due to the Middle Eastern states’ refusal to make concessions.114
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sceptical to the possibility of achieving lasting peace in the Middle East, this still was an 
important goal for them. Stability in the Middle East was seen as the best insurance against 
Soviet infiltration, and the recent Egyptian arms deal had further convinced Dulles and 
Eisenhower that this was a more imminent danger than ever. Thus, the Americans continued 
promoting proposals for Arab-Israeli peacemaking, this time through the United Nations.  
The Hammarskjöld Mission 
Early in 1956, Dulles proposed that a United Nations-dispatched mediator would arrange 
peace talks with the question of Palestinian refugees and borders as its primary issues. The 
Security Council passed a resolution accepting this proposition on 5 April 1956. Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjöld was appointed to the difficult task. Before Hammarskjöld could 
commence his work, however, further violence between Israel and Egypt strangled the 
mission before it had started. Instead of negotiating a permanent settlement, Hammarskjöld’s 
mission became a desperate attempt to avoid war.115
Hammarskjöld managed to avoid war in April, despite the fact that both sides had 
violated the armistice agreements. In light of the recent confrontations there was no hope for a 
comprehensive peace plan. Hammarskjöld’s mission ended in June, when the Security 
Council passed a new resolution, urging the parties to observe the ceasefire, respect 
armistices, and “demonstrating their wish for peaceful conditions”.
  
116
A New War in the Middle East 
 In the end, 
Hammarskjöld’s mission was only one out of many futile efforts to end the stalemate that had 
prevented peace in the Middle East. Instead the tension in the region was rising again, with 
the build-up to crisis in mid-1956.  
Throughout the period 1945-1956, US authorities chose several paths to try to handle the 
unruly Middle East. The establishment of a new state in the region; the border conflicts and 
wars that arose as a result of this; and the difficulty of maintaining friendly or at least cordial 
relations with both the Arab states and Israel without estranging them or the population at 
home proved a challenge for both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. Unfortunately this was 
a challenge that could not always be met, and frequently the US efforts to treat the parties 
equally only resulted in severed relations with both the Arabs and the Israelis. Establishing the 
US as a great power in the Middle East while containing the Soviet Union was to become 
gradually more important during the next decade.  
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Attempts at creating peace and stability in the Middle East after World War Two 
showed that the Arab-Israeli conflict was more complex than any of the erstwhile initiatives 
had accounted for. The issues in the conflict were – and still are – so deeply entwined that it is 
almost impossible to separate them from each other, and, consequently, equally impossible to 
create peace or stability without taking this into consideration. Why, then, did the US continue 
with its piecemeal approach, not even trying to solve, but only to manage conflict issues such 
as refugees and water? Why did the US authorities not try to promote a comprehensive peace 
in the Middle East after the next big showdown, the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956, which 
escalated into another full-scale war? 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stepping Up: October 1956-March 1957 
The hostilities of the war that started on 29 October 1956 ended with a ceasefire ten days 
later.117
Diplomacy in a State of Shock 
 President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles worked intensely during and in 
the aftermath of the hostilities, first to achieve a diplomatically acceptable ceasefire and then 
to make the aggressors pull out from the Egyptian areas. With the successful US part in 
terminating the 1956 war, it appeared that the US was about to enter into a new role in the 
Middle East. But were they ready? What would this role be, and why did they decide to take 
on this responsibility in a region the United States previously had largely left to its European 
allies?  
Suez had been a point of worry ever since Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser declared 
the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956. Prior to this, the American 
relationship with Egypt had become very strained. The Egyptian recognition of the People’s 
Republic of China, and the subsequent withdrawal of the American offer to fund the Egyptian 
Aswan Dam project were among the incidents that had led to a very cold tone between the 
two countries. However, through a number of diplomatic efforts, most importantly the 
London Conference on 16 August, some of the immediate warmongering had seemingly 
cooled down. Even Britain and France, which had been among the loudest dissident voices to 
Nasser’s declaration because the majority of shareholders in the Canal Company were British 
and French, appeared inclined to accept a diplomatic solution rather than a military one.118
In addition, there were other issues that seemed more likely to spark violence both in 
the Middle East and elsewhere. On the Israeli-Jordanian border there were several clashes 
between Jordanian infiltrators and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). The instability of the 
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domestic political situation in Jordan was also a cause of concern, especially when the 
Americans received (false) reports that King Hussein had been assassinated. If hostilities were 
to break out between Israel and its neighbours, it seemed more likely to be on the Jordanian 
front than the Egyptian one.119
The Middle East was only one of the areas demanding the Eisenhower 
administration’s attention. On 19 October mass demonstrations broke out against the Soviet 
Union in Poland. On 23 October Hungary was engulfed in rebellion, following the 
inauguration of the new Prime Minister, Imre Nagy. The Hungarian people were eager to 
adopt a model similar to the Polish one, where the local government enjoyed greater 
independence from Moscow than most of the Soviet Bloc countries. The world held its breath 
awaiting the Soviet reaction to the Hungarian democratic aspirations.
  
120 In Washington, D.C., 
there was hope that the developments in Poland and Hungary in a long-term perspective 
might lead to weaker ties between these countries and the Soviet Union, perhaps a sign that 
the Soviet Bloc was crumbling.121 In a short-term perspective, however, the US authorities 
were aware that there was a risk for a Soviet invasion to regain control of Hungary. Such an 
invasion had the potential for expanding into a larger war. Thus, both Eisenhower and Dulles 
were extremely careful not to say anything or act in any way that could be perceived as a 
challenge by the Soviet Union.122
Additionally, the US presidential election was approaching. Seeking a second term in 
the White House, Eisenhower could hardly ignore the domestic popular opinion when 
deciding how to respond to the problems on the international stage. According to Dulles it 
was not entirely unlikely that Israel would attempt to take advantage of the US election when 
timing a potential attack on Jordan. Eisenhower was therefore determined not to let electoral 
concerns dictate his foreign policy.
  
123
Thus the attack on Egypt came as a bolt from the blue to the Eisenhower government. 
When the first reports of the Israeli attack arrived in Washington, the immediate US reaction 
was to turn to their European partners in the Middle East – Britain and France. One of the 
pressing questions when the threat of war over Suez could no longer be ignored was whether 
the Tripartite Declaration could or should be revived. The Declaration, originally issued by 
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Britain, France and the United States as a means of regulating arms supply in the Middle East, 
had become a frequent point of reference in American foreign policy towards the region since 
1950. However, it did not appear that the parties were particularly committed to the 
Declaration. France especially, which had been a major arms supplier for Syria even prior to 
the signing of the declaration, could not be said to be very dedicated to this responsibility. 
France had begun export of arms to Israel in 1950. The US and Britain were aware of and 
objected to this, but the arms shipments continued with a brief pause in 1955-1956.124 In 
1956, the Eisenhower administration even convinced the French and Canadian governments 
to sell military jets to Israel, as a means of taking some of the pressure off of Israeli arms 
demands to the US.125
Despite its obvious limitations in terms of actually reducing arms in the Middle East, 
the Tripartite Declaration had remained important in demonstrating the unity of the three 
partners. However, Anglo-American staff talks concerning the future of the Tripartite 
cooperation in the first half of 1956 had not led anywhere, and when addressing the question 
of the declaration’s applicability to the situation in Suez, the Americans found that the British 
and French described the Tripartite Declaration as “inoperable”.
  
126
Little did the Eisenhower administration know that their European allies already were 
deeply involved in the acts of war. The British and French had secretly undergone 
negotiations with Israel, and in an agreement signed by Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-
Gurion, French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau and British Foreign Office Undersecretary 
Patrick Dean, an attack against Egypt to oust Nasser was planned. The Americans knew 
nothing of the plot.
  
127
Speculations were flying at a conference Eisenhower had with the Secretary and 
several of their advisors on 30 October. At this point it was fairly clear that both the French 
and the British were more deeply involved than they pretended to be. The President suggested 
that the British might plan on settling the issue over Suez quickly to ensure an uninterrupted 
oil supply. Undersecretary Herbert Hoover Jr. implied that the Europeans were seeking to 
force the Americans to choose sides – either their allies or the Arabs. Secretary Dulles 
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wondered whether the British and the French counted too much upon their US friends, 
knowing that they would not let them “go under economically”.128 Later that same day, 
Dulles voiced a suspicion that the British and the French were in on Israel’s attack.129
Even though suspicions were raised, the American government still did not know the 
full extent of Britain and France’s involvement. In an attempt to clarify the situation, 
President Eisenhower sent a personal letter to Eden, demanding to be enlightened. 
Eisenhower also enquired on the British stand on a possible continuation of the Tripartite 
cooperation.
 
130 Before there was any reason to expect a reply, however, the picture became 
clearer by new reports from the Middle East. On 30 October 1956 Britain and France issued 
an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt, demanding that both sides stop all acts of war and withdraw 
from the Canal Zone. In addition, Egypt was expected to accept a temporary Anglo-French 
occupation.131 Since Israel was in on the staged ultimatum, they complied. The Egyptians on 
the other hand raged that they, as the attacked party, were asked to withdraw, especially 
considering it was their own territory they were supposed to withdraw from. Israeli forces, on 
the other hand, would remain on Egyptian territory. Thus Egypt refused to act in accordance 
with the ultimatum, as expected by the three conspirators. As a result, Britain and France used 
this as an excuse to intervene. By 31 October the image of an Anglo-French-Israeli conspiracy 
was forming in the minds of the members of the US National Security Council (NSC). The 
extent of France’s military equipment export to Israel was larger than the Americans had 
imagined, and there were intelligence reports about a rapid increase in the French-Israeli 
communication prior to the outbreak of hostilities. There were also indications that the British 
involvement was significant.132
Eisenhower was outraged. He did not think that the British and the French had an 
“adequate cause for war.”
  
133
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as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes.”134 Eisenhower 
also communicated this view directly to his European colleagues. In a message to Eden and 
the French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, the President expressed his concern about the 
European actions in the conflict. Eisenhower urged the prime ministers to reconsider what he 
called “drastic action”, especially at a time when the matter was about to be considered by the 
Security Council.135
The upcoming discussions in the United Nations were of concern to the Americans. 
The main worry seemed to be that if the Americans failed to act, the Soviet Union might be 
able to make a move and effectively take charge in the UN. Dulles considered this particularly 
risky in the present situation where a number of previously colonized states were emerging, 
seeking friendship and alliances on the international stage. If the US sided with the British 
and French against Egypt, Dulles feared that this would irrevocably link the United States 
with the colonial policies of Britain and France. Thus the newly independent states would 
unavoidably gravitate towards the Soviet Union. This was unacceptable.
  
136
It is nothing less than tragic that we at this very time, when we are on the point of 
winning an immense and long-hoped-for victory over Soviet colonialism in Eastern 
Europe, we should be forced to choose between following in the footsteps of Anglo-
French colonialism in Asia and Africa, or splitting our course away from their 
course.
  
137
Dulles later claimed that choosing not to side with their allies was the hardest decision he and 
President Eisenhower ever had to make.
  
138 However, the conclusion was clear, even if it was 
painstakingly reached: the Americans had to oppose the British and French, to take a firm 
stand in the Suez Canal Conflict, and it had to be done in a way that would not estrange any 
other allies. The US also wanted to send a message to the Soviet Union making it absolutely 
clear who was in charge. Thus, the scene had to be the United Nations. However, the 
Americans faced several difficulties in the UN. The first US attempt to bring the issue up in 
front of the Security Council was vetoed by Britain and France. This was the first time Britain 
had ever used their veto power.139
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proposed by the Soviet Union, were also vetoed.140
Acting Like a Superpower 
 Not willing to give up, however, the 
superpowers were forced to turn to alternative options.  
Eisenhower was determined to find a solution in the United Nations system, and he was 
equally determined to beat the Soviet Union to it.141 It was preferable to the US government 
to work through the UN rather than outside it “since that body [the UN] is so intimately linked 
with the Palestine problem”.142 This also reflects the Eisenhower administration’s tendency to 
use the UN as a tool to promote US interests. While the Eisenhower administration publicly 
claimed that the United Nations was a cornerstone of American policy, in reality the UN 
seemed more like a stepping stone during the Eisenhower era.143 During and after the 1956 
war in the Middle East, the UN was definitely considered by the Americans as a means for 
American policy. The United Nations became the multilateral alibi the Americans needed to 
achieve credibility in the post-colonial world. At the same time, the UN was dependant on the 
US for support and leadership.144
In November 1956, however, the UN was not the easiest arena since Britain and 
France were blocking the Security Council with their vetoes. Instead, the Americans were 
forced to turn to a Yugoslavian proposal of employing a not-yet used resolution stemming 
from the Korean War. “Uniting for Peace” had been passed while the Soviet Union was 
boycotting the Security Council due to the United Nations’ refusal to recognize the People’s 
Republic of China. Assuming that the Soviet Union might return to the Security Council, the 
other members of the Council took the opportunity to install a security net to avoid a potential 
Soviet veto, which would have rendered the Council ineffective. The “Uniting for Peace”-
resolution gave the opportunity for the General Assembly in a scheduled or emergency 
assembly to take over a Security Council case where the Council was unable to act due to 
internal disagreement, and thus failed to “exercise its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and stability”.
  
145
In the heat of the crisis on 31 October 1956, President Eisenhower was not entirely 
convinced that a special session of the General Assembly invoking “Uniting for Peace” would 
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be the best possible solution. His main objection was that he was not sure it would have the 
desired limiting effect on the British and French plans. However, under the circumstances – 
where handing the issue over to the General Assembly received increased support in the 
United Nations – Eisenhower thought it favourable to go along with the plans and thus have a 
reasonable chance of controlling the special session. Otherwise the special session might take 
place anyway, but with the Soviet Union in charge. Eisenhower also hoped a General 
Assembly resolution might avoid the crisis becoming even more severe than it already was.146 
The special session of the General Assembly was called on in a Security Council Resolution 
on 31 October.147
The General Assembly’s special session commenced on 1 November. Dulles made a 
personal appearance to introduce an American proposal for a ceasefire resolution. This 
resolution, in reality a severe condemnation of Britain, France and Israel, was passed with an 
overwhelming majority on the night between 1 and 2 November. Both Egypt and Israel 
accepted the ceasefire on 3 November, but the two European states were not prepared to give 
up. No French or British soldiers had yet landed in Egypt, but the British were firm in their 
position to go on with the invasion as planned. Their reasoning was that they could not leave 
the Suez Canal area to its own justice with Egypt and Israel still in conflict with each other. 
One possibility, however, was to follow up on a Canadian proposal of the establishment of a 
United Nations force that could police the war zone. This would allow the British and French 
troops to pull out without completely losing face.
 Ironically, the first time the resolution was employed it was against two 
Western powers blocking the Council, and not the Soviet Union. 
148
The resolution establishing a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was adopted 
in the General Assembly on 4 November. Because it was the first time the United Nations had 
ever dispatched a force, however, it was going to take some time to form it. In the meantime 
the war continued in Egypt. On 5 and 6 November, British and French soldiers landed outside 
of Port Said in Egypt. On the morning of 5 November Israel also made one final conquest, 
occupying the important Sharm el-Sheikh on the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula just in 
time to be in possession of the area for the duration of the ceasefire.
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Union out of the conflict, on 5 November the Soviet premier Nikolai Bulganin sent letters to 
the Israelis, the British and the French, threatening them with military action if they did not 
immediately stop their advance.150 The hostilities finally ended on 7 November, after Britain 
and France agreed to a ceasefire the previous day.151 6 November was a good day for 
Eisenhower. Not only did Britain and France finally accept the UN ceasefire, but Eisenhower 
was also re-elected for a second term in the White House with an overwhelming majority, 
though with a Democratic majority in Congress.152
It had largely been US pressure on the Europeans that had convinced them to back 
down. Britain was in dire need of oil and money. The pound sterling had deteriorated severely 
since the start of the crisis, and the only way out of the financial quagmire the British 
currency was heading into would be a fresh flow of cash from the International Money Fund 
(IMF), which was blocked by the Americans for as long as the British continued to oppose the 
UN. Likewise, the British were dependent upon a continuous flow of petroleum. With the 
Suez Canal closed by Nasser and oil pipelines blown up by other Arab states, the supply was 
at stake.
  
153 Looking for ways to make the aggressors back down, however, the United States 
was reluctant to allow Britain the requested money and oil, and thus British Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden was forced to give up on Suez. The battle in the Middle East was not worth 
fighting at the risk of ruining Britain’s economy.154 In addition, the British government faced 
problems with the domestic public opinion. Fresh polls showed that the public disagreed with 
the government’s acts in the Middle East.155 The French government was not prepared to fight 
for the Suez Canal without Britain, and thus the British and French troops were pulled out 
from Sinai by late December.156
Even though Eisenhower had been absolutely furious with his European partners, he 
was not prepared to let their differences over Suez ruin the prospect of future cooperation in 
the Middle East. The Soviet Union was still the main threat, in Eisenhower’s eyes, and in the 
battle against “the Bear”, the US needed allies. Already the day after the ceasefire, 
Eisenhower had made up his mind: There was no point in “indulging in recriminations with 
the British, but rather that we should jointly consider what should be done in the face of the 
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Russian threat.”157 Eisenhower had come to realize that alienating his number one ally in the 
Middle East was detrimental to American interests in the region. Without British help and 
friendship, the US would not be able to realize its own goals. For instance, Eisenhower 
worried that without British help the American intelligence in the Middle East was 
incomplete.158
Convincing Israel  
  
Israel was the undisputed military victor of the war. When the UN ceasefire came into effect 
on midnight between 6 and 7 November, Israel occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula and the 
Gaza Strip.159 This meant that Israel also controlled the Straits of Tiran, which the Israelis 
claimed was crucial for shipping to and from Israel, since this was the only access point to the 
port in Eilat. Without Israeli access to the Straits, the only other access to the sea was on the 
other side of the country – in the Mediterranean. The Egyptians had prevented Israeli ships 
from passing through the Suez Canal since the 1948 war, and in order to avoid further 
disturbance in water-borne supplies, the Israeli government considered it a vital interest to 
maintain control over Tiran, or at least to ensure that Egypt was not given the option of 
blocking them.160
In a speech to the Knesset on 7 November Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion strongly 
hinted that it was Israel’s intention to hold on to the Straits of Tiran and the Sinai 
Peninsula.
 
161 However, he had assured Dulles via Israel’s Ambassador to the US, Abba Eban, 
on 1 November 1956 that Israel would not “hold on to any territory occupied as a result of 
present military operations”. It was their intention to withdraw, but only under conditions that 
would “assure Israel’s security and maritime freedom.”162
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prepared to comply with the United Nations or Eisenhower’s demand for immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal.163
It had been Eisenhower’s wish to convince Israel of withdrawal without turning to 
threats. As this proved difficult, however, the options discussed were all intended to affect the 
monetary remittances Israel received from the US. It was within the power of the US 
government to impose either an embargo or taxation on all funds, including private 
contributions, sent to Israel. Both were expected to have a significant effect on the Israeli 
government, hopefully enough to make Israel withdraw to the armistice line.
  
164 This was the 
only acceptable solution to the US, and it was regarded as crucial that a withdrawal was not 
postponed for too long. “The only question with regard to the immediacy of the withdrawal 
[from Egyptian territory] would be that no military or political vacuum is created by the 
withdrawal of the forces.”165 Because UNEF troops entered Sinai on 15 November 1956, 
there should be no reason to fear such a vacuum anymore.166 However, Israel refused to 
withdraw before two crucial terms were fulfilled: that Israel was guaranteed passage through 
Tiran and that there would be no more Fedayeen raids from Gaza.167
President Eisenhower sent a letter to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion expressing 
disappointment that Israel had failed to withdraw in accordance with the General Assembly 
resolution of 2 November 1956, urging Israel to withdraw immediately.
 
168 Certain minor 
withdrawals were made, but the Jewish state was not willing to give up Sinai until it was 
assured it would be granted access to the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel also continued to control Gaza, 
but this was more a means of hindering Egypt from controlling it than because Israel wanted 
to hold on to the problematic strip of land. “[W]ho would want it?” Dulles wondered about 
Gaza.169
The US administration’s hesitancy towards imposing sanctions against Israel was also 
affected by the domestic political situation in the US: Eisenhower was under pressure from 
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the new Democratic majority in Congress. Several Israel-friendly senators were demanding 
that the Republican administration did not support a solution that would return the Israeli 
security situation to the status quo ante bellum, the pre-war situation. In short, they agreed 
with Israel that it would be most unfortunate if Egypt were to be allowed to continue blocking 
Israeli transit through international waterways and fedayeen raids from Gaza.170 Despite the 
fact that Israel had been the aggressor in the war, and despite the continued Israeli presence on 
Egyptian territories, the US was hesitant to impose sanctions on Israel alone. As long as the 
Americans believed Egypt also violated certain UN resolutions, Eisenhower and Dulles were 
not prepared to support sanctions against Israel.171
Israel did not make this easy. In an attempt to include certain favourable conditions to 
a withdrawal the Israelis were realizing they sooner or later would have to accept, Israel 
presented an aide-mémoire where they accepted the presence of UNEF in the Gulf of Aqaba 
area, but not in Gaza. This was a poorly disguised strategy for Israel’s real goal: to remain in 
control of Sharm el-Sheik. Because of the Israeli “take-it-or-leave-it policy”, the US 
Permanent Representative to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., feared that a General Assembly 
resolution imposing sanctions on Israel was inevitable.
  
172
Eventually the Americans tried to offer Israel a carrot. On 11 February Dulles notified 
the Israelis that the US viewed the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway, and that 
American ships would be willing to ensure that the right of innocent passage was observed.
 
173 
Through this, the US actually went a long way in accepting Israeli demands by declaring its 
support for viewing the Gulf as an international waterway, and in Israel it was regarded as a 
security guarantee for a considerable Israeli interest; which the Jewish state had sought from 
the superpower for a long time. Regardless of this, however, Israel was still not prepared to 
cave in. Ben-Gurion continued to resist the demands for withdrawal, and he was furious with 
the US for putting pressure on Israel when he believed they had let Egypt off the hook for 
blocking Israeli transit in the Gulf of Aqaba.174
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Due to the unfavourable Israeli reply, the Americans turned to sticks. Making the 
pressure public, Eisenhower chose to condemn the Israeli failure to withdraw to the Armistice 
Agreements of the 1948 war on radio and television.”Should a nation which attacks and 
occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose 
conditions on its own withdrawal?” he asked rhetorically.175 And finally, towards the end of 
February 1957, the US was prepared to discuss sanctions. In a draft resolution from Dulles to 
the US United Nations delegation on 21 February, all governments were urged to withhold 
assistance to Israel.176
Israel was left with little choice. Foreign Minister Golda Meir announced to the UN 
General Assembly on 1 March 1957 that a complete Israeli withdrawal would take place 
shortly. What eventually made Israel withdraw was the threat of UN sanctions; the risk of 
complete isolation in world matters; and the combination of the United States’ assurances and 
refusal to relent. On 8 March the last Israeli troops left Egyptian territories, transferring the 
power to UNEF. In the end, the only territorial modification that came as a result of the 1956 
war was that the demilitarized zone in El Auja on the border between Israel and Sinai was 
remilitarized and in effect became Israeli territory. This is not entirely without significance, 
however, since El Auja was an important strategic location from which attacks both on Israel 
and Egypt had been launched during the 1948 war. Despite this, this was a minor territorial 
change considering the overwhelming Israeli victory in the war.
  
177
How important was the role of the United States in ending the war in 1956? Historian 
and journalist Keith Kyle argues that it was important, but the situation was also unique. 
Eisenhower’s firm stand in 1956 achieved something rare – Israel backed down following US 
pressure. However, the conditions were ideal. First of all, Eisenhower had just stood through 
the crisis in the Middle East while holding the fort in the US election. With a landslide 
victory, he had the necessary popular support at home and thus he was in a position to be bold 
in the Middle East. Secondly, the pressure put upon Israel was not singularly American. As 
Kyle emphasizes, a second superpower, the Soviet Union, was also working towards an end 
of the Middle Eastern conflict. Left standing alone, there was little else Israel could do but 
obey.
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follow, or if the failure to create peace in the Middle East rather was an expression of lack of 
will to do so.  
A New Middle Eastern Grouping?  
As a result of the US role in ending the 1956 war, the Eisenhower administration was more 
popular in Arab countries than before. For instance, the signals from Nasser were that he 
hoped the US would fill the vacuum in commerce and industry created by the Anglo-French 
withdrawal from most of their industrial and commercial interests in the Middle East.179 
However, the Arab opinion of the US was rapidly subject to change. The Americans were 
surprised at what they perceived as lack of gratitude expressed by the Arabs concerning the 
US role in forcing the Israeli, British and French troops to withdraw from Egyptian 
territories.180 There existed a mutual suspicion between the Americans and the Arabs. The 
Americans believed that Egypt and Syria, both condescendingly described as “neutralist”, 
were forming closer relationships with the Soviet Union.181 Nasser, Eisenhower concluded, 
was an “evil influence”, and the problem in the 1956 war had not been the British and French 
ambition to overthrow him, but their timing.182
The Arabs, on the other hand, were disappointed that the tendency they had expected 
to develop after the 1956 war, with a more Arab-friendly United States, had not been fulfilled. 
For instance, Egyptian Ambassador to the US, Dr. Ahmed Hussain, communicated what he 
believed was a common perception in Egypt: the US was “employing economic warfare 
against Egypt”.
  
183
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East. Most importantly, perhaps, was the fact that many Arabs considered the US withdrawal 
from the funding of the Aswan Dam a decisive trigger to the conflict in the first place.184
The apparent solution in order to mend the bad relations and to limit Soviet influence 
was a rethinking of the American policy in the Middle East, and more specifically increasing 
the American presence in the region. One suggestion was for the US to join the Baghdad 
Pact.
  
185 Late in 1956 members of the State Department began to contemplate another option; 
the potential establishment of a new organization in the Middle East loosely modelled on 
either the Baghdad Pact or the Arab League. The idea was that an organization such as this 
might establish stronger ties between the Arab countries and the United States, and that intra-
Arab bonds would grow stronger. This might in turn avoid the formation of similar ties to 
form between the Middle Eastern countries and the Soviet Union.186
The Americans wanted the organization to engulf the already existing Baghdad Pact 
that since its establishment in 1955 had largely come to be considered by members and non-
members alike as a tool for British policy in the Middle East. The new organization should, in 
addition to the Middle Eastern Baghdad Pact members, preferably include other Arab states. 
Egypt and Syria would also be invited, but they were not expected to accept. State 
Department hoped, however, that their potential refusal to accept such an invitation would 
isolate them from the rest of the Arab community, and “emphasize their close ties with the 
Soviet Bloc.” It does appear that this desire to create Cold War camps in the Middle East was 
an attempt to scare the other Arab states away from the Soviet Bloc. In a longer perspective, 
the Americans hoped, the success of this organization might make Egypt and Syria see that 
they had no other choice than to join. Britain would not be invited to join.
  
187
One problem was that such an organization would not be able to include both the Arab 
states and Israel. It was even argued that it was to be expected that the organization would be 
a place for harbouring anti-Israeli sentiments, but that this might be the price the United States 
would have to pay in order to establish stability in the region.
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that US encouragement of the establishment of an organization open to all of Israel’s 
neighbours without an accompanying security guarantee to Israel would not become popular 
in certain quarters in the United States, or, understandably, in Israel.189
If such an organization were to be established, the degree and manner of US 
involvement had to be determined. Secretary Dulles did not wish for the United States to be a 
member of the intended organization.
 
190 The US was already under pressure to become a 
member of the Baghdad Pact, from the members of the Pact, and from American 
representatives both in the Baghdad Pact countries and in government agencies in 
Washington. However, the State Department strongly advised against joining. There was fear 
that US adherence might aggravate the Soviet Union, the Israelis and even some of the Arab 
countries.191 Thus, the US should not be a formal member. Instead, there was the possibility 
of making a “unilateral declaration of protection for the members [of the intended alternative 
Middle Eastern grouping] from Communist aggression”.192
In the end, the idea for a new US sponsored security organization in the Middle East 
was abandoned. Dulles decided that US policy in the region would be maintained on a 
bilateral basis as before.
 A unilateral declaration was the 
part of the proposed changes that eventually prevailed as the most attainable alternative.  
193
The Eisenhower Doctrine 
 This decision also put an end to any further discussion on US 
adherence to the Baghdad Pact. A further consequence of this decision was that the US did 
not have to make the difficult choice between Israel and the Arabs. Instead, the US 
government planned to make a unilateral move to signal US intentions to maintain a strong 
relationship with the Arab countries in the region, and to contain the Soviet Union.  
On 5 January 1957, President Eisenhower held a speech for Congress, where he declared the 
need for joint action between Congress and the Executive Branch – his government. This 
statement, later called the Eisenhower Doctrine, was supposed to be the guiding principle for 
US foreign policy in the Middle East for the years to come. In reality, however, the 
Eisenhower Doctrine was invoked mostly as a show of force. It only resulted in actual 
military action once, during the crisis in Lebanon in 1958.194
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The primary reasons that the Eisenhower administration wanted the Eisenhower 
Doctrine was to fill the power vacuum after Britain and France lost their importance in the 
Middle East after the 1956 war; to have a tool to deter Arab antagonism; and perhaps most 
importantly, to send a clear message to the Soviet Union. The United States would not accept 
increased Soviet influence in the Middle East. There was some discussion prior to 
Eisenhower’s address to Congress on whether the doctrine would also mention hostility 
between the Middle Eastern states or merely tackle “communist imperialism”. Had the former 
been included, the US would in principle have been a warrantor for peace in the Middle East. 
However, it was decided that the Eisenhower Doctrine would be targeted at communism 
specifically, and not on Middle Eastern conflict generally, seeing as “Communist imperialism 
is the principle danger in the Middle East.”195
By instituting the Eisenhower Doctrine the US administration asked Congress, which 
according to the US Constitution formally had to authorize all US military action, to authorize 
the Executive Branch to  
 
authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed 
forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political 
independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression 
from any nation controlled by International Communism.196
This allowed the Executive Branch to take action under the terms and conditions of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine without having to seek further permission in Congress.
 
197 In principle, 
the Eisenhower Doctrine could be viewed as carte blanche for invasion in the Middle East if 
necessary, though historians have stressed that Eisenhower’s interpretation of the doctrine 
was a strict one.198
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[with the] UK and France with [the] Middle East area.”199 In effect, the Eisenhower Doctrine 
marked the final end of Britain’s dominance in the Middle East, and it firmly established the 
United States as the dominant power.200
Comprehensive Peace or Unilateral Assurances? 
  
There was nothing in the Eisenhower Doctrine indicating that the United States was working 
towards a comprehensive peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, with the newly 
pronounced dedication to the region, there was hope that the US administration would lend a 
hand to the attempts of creating peace. Eisenhower had expressed that he wanted to keep a 
more balanced position than his predecessors. Many Arabs considered the way he handled the 
war in 1956 and the immediate aftermath of it a confirmation of this point of view. In the 
months that followed, however, there seemed to be a gradual transformation in Eisenhower’s 
esteem in the Middle East. The Arab states were not convinced that the President really tried 
to maintain a balanced policy towards the Middle East. Israel was aggravated that they did not 
receive any US security assurances. By trying to befriend everyone, the result seemed to be 
that the United States instead estranged the lot.  
The Eisenhower Doctrine, while being a potential tool for US economic or military 
intervention to stabilize the Middle East, was not a peace initiative. It was in fact not at all 
directed towards peace – its specific target was to deter communism. The unilateral nature of 
the doctrine might have been a way for the US government to assure that a similar situation 
like that of the autumn of 1956 would not happen again. The Eisenhower Doctrine was a way 
for the United States to consolidate and clarify the American position in the Middle East. It 
was a way of ensuring that no power vacuum would arise as the British and French positions 
were diminished, and to ensure that the Soviet Union did not increase its importance.  
It can be tempting to emphasize Eisenhower’s firm stand when faced with the difficult 
task of countering his allies and friends which might have an unfortunate effect on the results 
of the election he was in the middle of. It is, however, important to identify why Eisenhower 
was so adamant about standing up for what he believed was right. Had he sided with his 
allies, Eisenhower feared that the Soviet Union might increase its influence in the Middle 
East. In 1956, Eisenhower’s Cold War aims had the effect of giving the US a considerable 
role in establishing a ceasefire and making the aggressors withdraw from occupied territories 
in the Middle East. However, making comprehensive peace after the war did not fit as well 
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with the overall strategy of the Americans, and thus it was sacrificed in favour of Cold War 
goals.  
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Wishing Wells and Good Intentions 
Water was a crucial point of disagreement from the beginning of the multi-faceted conflict in 
the Middle East. How the scarce resources should be divided remained an important question 
for decades, and it was indirectly one of the reasons why the Arab-Israeli conflict again 
erupted into war in 1967. The Jordan River was the main supplier of fresh water for several 
countries in the region, and thus it became a point of struggle between Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria and, even though it was not a riparian, Egypt.201 Eric Johnston’s 1955 failure 
to convince the riparian countries to the Jordan River to sign the Johnston plan was one of 
several reasons that convinced the US government that the time was not ripe for a 
comprehensive peace agreement. Despite the Johnston mission’s limited success, the US 
government continued to promote the unsigned Johnston plan as a “yardstick” for at least 
another decade. 202
Thus, problems over shared water resources remained important in US policy towards 
the Arab-Israeli conflict for years to come. There was considerable fear in the US government 
that the water issue might result in an increase in intensity of the conflict in the Middle East, 
or even trigger another war. Since the riparian states did not cooperate in their diversion 
schemes, they frequently ran the risk of stepping on each other’s toes. Additionally, the US 
worried that underdevelopment and scarce water resources would lead to the spread of 
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communism in the region.203
Eisenhower’s Final Efforts  
 In what way did the US handle the Jordan waters controversy 
after 1956? Why did the US government continue its efforts in the Jordan waters question, 
and why did it eventually give up? What was the purpose of US involvement in the water 
issue post-Suez? 
At the end of Eisenhower’s presidency, belief in any progress towards Middle Eastern peace 
was close to zero. There was a conscious decision to avoid any US involvement in 
comprehensive peace initiatives over the Jordan waters controversy.204 It was even believed 
by many State Department officials that one of the main problems with securing local 
approval of the Johnston plan had been the US sponsorship of it. It made little sense, 
therefore, to initiate a new venture with the same basic flaw.205 In addition, the death of 
Secretary Dulles on 24 May 1959 affected the Eisenhower administration’s foreign policy 
engagement. Dulles was replaced by former Assistant Secretary Christian A. Herter, who did 
not have the experience or prestige of his predecessor.206
US policy towards the Jordan waters controversy became one of lying low and testing 
the waters, hoping that the relative calm that had existed in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the 
1956 war would continue. Instead of cooperative efforts the United States sponsored 
unilateral development projects, provided they did not exceed the individual allocations 
granted by the Johnston plan which the Americans continued to consider a yardstick for fair 
water sharing in the Middle East. First, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan announced their 
East Ghor project. This was a canal that would divert water from the Yarmouk River, a 
tributary to the Jordan River, to East Ghor. Because the plan was found to be consistent with 
the Jordanian kingdom’s allocations according to the Johnston plan, and because both US 
engineers and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) considered the 
project reasonable, the US State Department endorsed it in 1958, despite Israeli protests.
 Hence the political will and 
opportunity of peacemaking in the Middle East in the final years of Eisenhower’s presidency 
were non-existing. 
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The following year, however, Israeli construction on a water development project of 
their own caused further problems. The National Water Carrier, that was to be completed in 
1964, would divert water from Lake Tiberias to the Negev.208 This project received massive 
protests from the neighbouring countries, who threatened to divert the headwaters to the 
Jordan River into Lebanon and Syria before the river even reached Israel. In order to 
discourage the Arab states from taking such a drastic measure, and to avoid further 
controversy, the US only partly supported the Israeli project. The pretext for the US dismissal 
of the Israeli project was that the Israeli diversion exceeded the allocations granted to Israel 
under the Johnston plan, which the Americans still considered the fairest measurement for 
water sharing in the Jordan Valley.209
Israel sought both economic and political support from the Americans for its project, 
however, and it was thus important for the Israelis to establish that the National Water Carrier 
construction was not in conflict with the Johnston plan. Nevertheless, the Americans refused 
to give Israel the economic and political backing it sought. 
  
210 The main objection to the 
Israeli plan was that it might “impair prospects for obtaining an international agreement which 
we consider essential if the interests of all riparians are to be protected.”211
In the long run, however, it became difficult for the US government to avoid 
supporting the Israeli project. In a document imprecisely dated to “circa 1960”, a review of 
the US position towards Israeli claims shows that the discussion went back and forth between 
Washington and Tel Aviv regarding the terms in which the United States and Israel might 
agree to cooperate over a Jordan water development project. The discussion culminated in a 
re-examination of what Israel and the US based their interpretation of the Johnston plan upon. 
This revealed that the Israelis interpreted the plan based on a different document than the 
Americans.
 In short, the US 
government was desperately trying to remain friends with everyone.  
212
In the following months, the Israeli government threatened to implement an even more 
controversial plan. There were no prospects of international cooperation over the Jordan 
 Since there was no signed version of the Johnston plan, neither could be proven 
wrong, and this discrepancy in interpretations would become a problem for the practical 
applicability of the Johnston plan for the years to come. 
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waters, and the domestic political situation in the US made the refusal to support the original, 
less controversial Israeli plan difficult. Thus, the US eventually endorsed the original Israeli 
project.213
Revival of the Johnston Mission?  
  
Even though the prospects seemed bleak, there were those who wanted to explore the 
possibility of a new US effort in the Middle East to negotiate between the Jordan River basin 
users. The biggest optimist in this respect was former Ambassador Eric Johnston himself. 
After a visit to the Middle East in 1959, he wrote to the State Department, suggesting a re-
examination of the Jordan Valley project where he had been the chief negotiator between 
Israel and the Arab states. In the original Johnston mission, the goal had been to achieve 
agreement between the Middle Eastern states on a plan for cooperation on water development 
with the expressed intention that this eventually would facilitate settling of Palestinian 
refugees. Eric Johnston’s impression upon rekindling contact with his Middle Eastern 
acquaintances was that Egypt had mellowed to the idea of water cooperation, and he believed 
Egypt might be the key to convince the other Arab states to return to a water development 
scheme in accordance with the original Johnston plan.214
Eric Johnston continued to believe in the possible revival of his work in the Middle 
East. On 13 October 1959, he had talks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Dr. Mahmud Fawzi 
regarding the Jordan River development. While this conversation was made on a non-official, 
personal basis, it seems clear that Johnston’s intention was to research whether his 
engagement in a new mission to the Middle East would be possible. Johnston suggested to 
Fawzi that he might discuss the Jordan waters issue with Nasser again, and according to what 
Johnston reported back to State Department, Fawzi was “receptive”.
  
215 With the Egyptian 
Foreign Minister on board, Eric Johnston and some officials in the State Department believed 
there was reason to hope Nasser might accept a new round of Johnston negotiations.216 
However this was mostly a straw of hope Johnston was clinging to. The State Department did 
not feel the need to formally refuse the initiative as long as it was carried out by Johnston “on 
a personal basis”. When faced with an actual inquiry of Johnston’s as to the possibility of a 
renewal of the mission, however, the State Department declined to support this.217
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years ago. The linkage between the development of shared water resources and the Palestinian 
refugee problem made a continuation of the Johnston plan particularly difficult. Thus the 
refugee problem was separated from the Johnston plan in further US planning.218
While the US government ceased to try to achieve formal agreement over the Johnston 
plan, it was still considered as a tacit accord that would serve as a yardstick to govern the 
riparian outtake of water from the Jordan River and its tributaries. For the following years the 
US used the Johnston plan as a measurement for whether they considered proposed water 
development projects in and around the Jordan Valley legal and just. This way they sought to 
bind the riparian countries unilaterally to the framework of the plan.
  
219
The pretext for the US endorsement for Israeli water development had been the Israeli 
promise of sticking to the Johnston plan allocations. Throughout the autumn of 1959, the 
Israeli government worried that the US government did not appear to give them as much 
support for their water development plans as the Israelis believed it did for the Hashemite 
kingdom of Jordan. Israel also complained that the US government did not believe the Israelis 
when they assured them that their projects were consistent with the Johnston plan. The US 
response to this was that it was not so much that they did not believe the Israeli assurances, 
but that the Israeli interpretation of some of the technical aspects of the Johnston plan differed 
from the US interpretation.
  
220
One problem with securing a compromise between the US and Israel in this matter 
was that it would most likely not be one that the Arab states would accept, as the Arabs were 
considering water development schemes of their own. Thus the US tried to stall the matter 
and avoid an unconditional acceptance of the Israeli point of view. In addition the Middle 
East was further destabilized as a result of intra-Arab conflicts. Tension as a result of the 
Syrian withdrawal from the union with Egypt in 1961, domestic revolt in several of the Arab 
states and the extensive Egyptian involvement in the Yemen civil war contributed to the 
already complex political situation in the region. The US government firmly sought to avoid 
any involvement in the intra-Arab conflict.
 Thus it became important for any US-Israeli cooperation in 
water questions to settle these differences, and make sure that their interpretations were the 
same.  
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The Democratic candidate John F. Kennedy was elected president in November 1960, 
and took office in January 1961. With him as Vice-President was former senator Lyndon B. 
Johnson, and Dean Rusk became Secretary of State. Kennedy represented a breath of fresh air 
in American politics. He presented himself as a man of action, and a man of vision. Already 
before he became president, Kennedy had shown great interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As 
a senator, Kennedy had advocated a change of US policy towards the Middle East.222 He 
greatly admired Israel, but he was also impressed by Arab nationalism and President Nasser in 
particular. Kennedy wanted to have solid relations with both the Arab states and Israel, a wish 
that was going to prove difficult to fulfil.223
In a letter to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, President Kennedy assured his 
colleague that the US would support an Israeli withdrawal project as long as it was within the 
Johnston plan allocations.
  
224 Kennedy advocated the link between water development and 
peace, but in reality the US authorities had already made the decision not to make a new 
initiative in a project designed to promote both peace and water development.225
Water Wars 
  
In the spring of 1962, the tension that had prevailed over the shared water resources in the 
Middle East reached new heights. On 8 March, there were “hostile exchanges” between Syria 
and Israel, and this culminated in an Israeli reprisal on 16-17 March.226 The Americans were 
infuriated. First of all there was reason to expect that the tension might interfere with the 
missions of the near-namesake of Eric Johnston, Dr. Joseph Johnson, who was working as 
Special Representative for the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) in an effort to make 
the Arab states and Israel to agree to a solution to the Palestine refugee problem.227
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Representatives from the State Department made it absolutely clear to the Israelis that a raid 
such as this was completely unacceptable.228
In an attempt at explaining the provocation behind the attack, the Israeli Ambassador 
Harman described Lake Tiberias and its shore as 100 per cent Israeli. The Bureau of Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA) United Nations Adviser, James M. Ludlow, 
mentioned that the US did not share this view. The Israelis were deeply disturbed by this 
notion, as they worried that US hesitancy in this matter would give the Syrians a green light 
for pursuing sovereignty over an area the Jewish state considered Israeli territory. A 
clarification from Ludlow specified that because of the demilitarized zone on the Tiberias 
shore, the territorial status of parts of the shore was in fact undetermined since the General 
Armistice Agreements from the 1948 war.
  
229
Harman’s portrayal of the situation was one where the Syrians had repeatedly broken 
the peace ever since the beginning of February, and that no result had come from the Israeli 
attempt to take this up with UNTSO. The incident on 8 March, according to the Israelis, was a 
turning point because the Syrians started using recoilless rifles. The Israeli interpretation was 
that Syrian shooting had become more militarily organized, and thus it was a defining 
moment in the Israeli view on the security threat the Syrian shooting posed.
  
230
A ceasefire was secured by the UNTSO Chief of Staff on 17 March, and the matter 
was taken to the UN Security Council. A resolution was adopted on 9 April 1962. The 
resolution condemned the Israeli attack of 16-17 March, and determined that it was a breach 
of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement.
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victories in this and other clashes, and eventually the Syrian border was one of the most 
unstable leading up to the 1967 war.232
The problems over shared water resources continued to play an important role in the 
conflicts and tensions in the region. The Arab states still considered the Israeli diversion a 
threat. The Lebanese President Fuad Chehab even went so far as to suggest that this diversion 
constituted the largest threat to the peace in the Middle East.
 
233
Salting the Pill? 
 However, the Arabs had yet to 
discover one of the important aspects of the threat posed by the Israeli diversion.  
One problem that gradually became more imminent was to ensure some sort of control of the 
increased salinity of the Jordan River. With several diversion projects taking place without 
consideration for each other, the salinity of the river was increasing dramatically. Pumping 
fresh water from upstream headwaters rendered the remaining, downstream water more salt 
than before. In addition, Lake Tiberias already had a higher salt level than other regional 
waters due to salt springs in the lake. Thus releasing water from Tiberias into the Jordan River 
would increase the salinity of the lower valley water source.234
The kingdom of Jordan was worst off, being the lower valley riparian. As a 
consequence of the Jordanian kingdom’s own East Ghor project, the salinity of the river was 
already rising when a new controversy materialized. In the spring of 1963, the Israeli 
government decided to send salt springs from Lake Tiberias into the Jordan River, in an 
attempt to reduce the salinity of the lake. An alternative option which would have preserved 
the Jordan for irrigation by only periodically using the river for this purpose was rejected 
because it required cooperation between Israel and Jordan. When the US Embassy in Israel 
was informed about this, and that it would render the Jordan River unfit for irrigation in its 
lower valley, the American response was to desperately seek dissociation with what they 
anticipated would make the Israelis even more unpopular among its neighbours.
  
235
The Americans tried to buy time. They advised the Israelis to delay further action until 
an American water expert had a chance to look things over. In 1963 Wayne Criddle left for 
the Middle East in secret. He had been the hydrology consultant to Eric Johnston during the 
negotiations in 1954-55, and he later worked as a consultant for the US State Department.
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well as the Jordanians were sticking to the Johnston plan allocations.237 In a report to the State 
Department, Criddle affirmed that both Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom were within the 
allocations given to them under the Johnston plan. He also found that it would be the 
Jordanian project that would first raise the salinity levels of the Jordan River to a dangerous 
level.238
Another of Criddle’s discoveries was that the Hashemite Kingdom was not utilizing its 
full capacity. This was partly due to lack of cooperation with Israel, and partly due to a 
Jordanian underestimate of the amount of water the Hashemite Kingdom was entitled to in 
accordance with the Johnston plan. Israel, according to Criddle’s report, was willing to release 
the water the Hashemite Kingdom was entitled to, and thus ensure an enhanced utility of the 
Jordan waters.
  
239 However, once again the US-Israeli disagreement regarding the Johnston 
plan became an issue. According to the Israeli view, the Johnston plan had envisioned that 
Israel would use the Jordan River for dumping its saline water. For the Americans this was 
problematic. They were not willing to support Israel’s action, since it would provoke the Arab 
states once they found out. On the other hand, it was nearly impossible for the Americans not 
to support it if the Johnston plan did. As long as the US and Israeli interpretation of the plan 
did not coincide, however, the US did not have to make the difficult choice between the 
Johnston plan and Israeli pressure.240
Wayne Criddle also made some suggestions of how to further employ the Johnston 
plan allocations, again directed towards Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom. The United States 
hoped to use Criddle’s expertise as an entry to establish cooperation between Israel and the 
Hashemite Kingdom over shared water resources. 
  
241
Criddle developed a technical formula that specified the amount the Hashemite 
Kingdom and Israel would be allowed to withdraw from Lake Tiberias and the Yarmouk 
River, an amount in consistence with the Johnston plan. King Hussein was, however, under 
great pressure from the Arab political community, especially the Baath parties in Syria, Iraq 
and within his own kingdom, and from Egypt. An agreement between Israel and any Arab 
state was unacceptable for the other Arabs. Consequently, Hussein was pressured to refuse the 
proposed cooperation, despite the fact that this meant that the Hashemite Kingdom would not 
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receive a sufficient amount of water.242 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan eventually 
rejected Wayne Criddle’s proposals publicly, but King Hussein personally assured the 
Americans that Jordan intended to remain within the Johnston plan allocations. Criddle never 
found any reason to doubt that the Hashemite Kingdom indeed stayed true to this promise.243
Taking a Stand: Lyndon B. Johnson and the Arab Summit 
 
On 22 November 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. Vice-President 
Lyndon B. Johnson took his place, and in the following period much of the communication 
back and forth to the Middle East consisted of condolences, reports of overseas grief for the 
late president, and assurances that US policy towards the region would not change 
significantly.244
The Arab states worried that Johnson, widely known to be an avid friend of Israel, 
would lead a more biased policy than his predecessor.
  
245 The concern in the Arab world was 
that the US government did not appreciate the full extent of the Arab feeling of threat from 
the Israeli water development activities. Thus, for the Arabs it became even more important to 
consolidate their suspicions about Israel into a unified front. There was considerable worry 
that if Israel were allowed to carry on its water development plans, this would greatly increase 
the potential for immigration to Israel. Considerable population growth in Israel was not at all 
beneficial for the Arab states surrounding Israel because they assumed this would make the 
Jewish state stronger.246
Israel, on the other hand, took the opportunity of the presidential change to again 
attempt a clarification of where the US and Israeli interpretation of the Johnston plan differed. 
One such point was whether or not the Israelis through the Johnston plan had accepted mutual 
observation of water projects, which the Israelis unyieldingly refused. To Rusk, this was 
unacceptable: “we regard Israel as committed to all repeat all of the Unified Plan [the 
Johnston plan], not just those parts from which it benefits and therefore likes.” 
  
247
Towards the end of 1963, the US State Department feared that the Arab states might 
use the Israeli diversion of Jordan waters as an excuse to attack, either because the Arabs felt 
threatened or because they could not afford politically to lose face by not standing up to 
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Israel. The US Embassy in Cairo estimated that a political confrontation would be more likely 
than a military one, mostly because this would be most convenient for Egypt. To ensure that 
the Arab reaction would not be of a more violent character, however, it was crucial not to give 
the Arabs leaders any reason to jump the gun. Particularly important, the Americans believed, 
was to assure the Arab states that the US had no intention of using military means to protect 
the Israeli diversion. The Americans frantically tried to convince the Arabs that anything but a 
peaceful solution would be catastrophic for the region as a whole, and the Arab states in 
particular.248
Towards Israel, it was important to assure the Jewish state that the US government 
would strongly oppose Arab aggression in the event of an attack on the Israeli diversion 
project. On 23 and 24 January 1964, Israel’s Ambassador to the US Avraham Harman had 
talks with Under Secretary W. Averell Harriman and Assistant Secretary Talbot regarding the 
US position towards the Jordan waters dispute. During these meetings, the Israeli ambassador 
was handed a note with some key US positions. These included that the US did not support a 
renegotiation of the Johnston plan, and a confirmation of the US support for Israeli diversions 
provided these were consistent with the original Johnston plan allocations. Despite the 
problems of employing an unsigned plan, the US authorities continued to stick to the Johnston 
plan.
 
249
This and other water related issues were becoming so overwhelming that Rusk felt the 
need to clarify the official US position. Preferably, the US involvement would be as minimal 
as possible, but if asked the diplomats were given a set of policy points of which they might 
speak. These included the basic US support for the Johnston plan and those projects 
considered within its limits. One of the main points Rusk and State Department wanted to 
communicate was that according to US estimates, the Arab fear of an extensive growth in 
Israel’s population was overrated. This was the case both because the diversion would not 
provide for the kind of numbers the Arabs feared, and because there were not that many 
potential Israeli immigrants left in the world. The US estimate was that even if the maximum 
number of potential immigrants settled in Israel, the Jewish state would be able to handle this 
with the level of resources and territory they already possessed.
  
250
President Johnson did not make any groundbreaking changes in the policy towards the 
Arab-Israeli conflict in the beginning of his presidency, but it would gradually become clear 
  
                                                 
248 Cairo to State, 9 November 1963, CFPF 1963, box 3817; Memorandum by Davies, 31 December 1963, 
CFPF 1963, box 4075. 
249 State to Tel Aviv, 25 January 1964, FRUS 1964-1968, 18:26-28. 
250 Rusk to all diplomatic posts, 14 January 1964, CFPF 1964-1966, box 1855. 
57 
 
that his attitude towards the Middle East was different, or at least it was perceived as 
different, than that of his predecessor. Continuing as Secretary of State in Johnson’s 
government, Dean Rusk also seemed ready for change. While he believed it would be 
necessary to maintain a balance in Middle Eastern relations, he nevertheless believed it was 
important for the US to show its support for Israel if the Arabs objected to what he perceived 
as important matters. The diversion of the Jordan waters was one of these important matters. 
Rusk believed it was high time that the US took a pro-Israel stand in the Jordan waters 
issue.251
Perhaps having his Secretary of State’s advice in mind, President Johnson held a 
speech in the American division of the Jewish research institution, the Weizmann Institute of 
Science in New York on 6 February 1964. Here, he spoke about Israel’s water problems, and 
his hopes that the US might cooperate with the Jewish state in future water development 
projects.
  
252 President Johnson’s speech followed a similar speech by Deputy Under Secretary 
Alexis Johnson on 20 January. The subject and timing of these speeches aroused anger among 
many Arabs who were already provoked by the Israeli unilateral actions.253 The Arabs 
believed that Israel’s plans to divert water were “illegal and inimical to Arab interests.”254 
Reports from King Hussein confirmed that the Arab perception of President Johnson’s 
Weizmann speech had been that the US was supporting the Israeli claim of a right to divert 
water away from the Jordan River basin, which the Arabs considered illegal and detrimental 
to their interests.255
Almost coinciding with the speeches of the two Johnsons was an important event in 
the Middle East. In January 1964, the Arab League gathered in Cairo for the first ever Arab 
Summit. They convened mainly as a result of the Israeli diversion of the Jordan River, and the 
goal was to consider the Israeli threat, and to discuss potential Arab countermoves. In addition 
this, and several following summits, was intended to break the impasse that existed in Arab 
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cooperation as a result of the internal conflict that had been going on for years.256 The Arabs 
feared that the Israeli diversion would reduce the Syrian and Jordanian water supplies 
considerably. As a result the preamble to the decisions of the summit had incorporated the 
first official, collective Arab declaration of “the final liquidation of Israel.”257
The Arab Summit also had a more specific outcome. Since none of the Arab states had 
accepted the Johnston plan, they had been standing without a guiding principle for the 
collective diversion of the Jordan waters, even if they in effect had stayed within the Johnston 
plan allocations. Whatever water development projects had been considered had been on a 
unilateral basis alone. Now, however, a collective Arab counter-plan was launched. It was 
decided that Syria and Lebanon would divert the headwaters of the Jordan River.
  
258
Revisiting the Revisited Johnston Plan? 
 
The problems of sticking to the Johnston plan no matter what were becoming obvious to those 
working in the State Department. Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA/NE) Rodger P. Davies believed that for the 
Johnston plan to have any further meaning, it was time it entered a third phase following the 
initial Eric Johnston mission and then the more recent US attempts to bind the riparian states 
to the framework of the plan. This period had been plagued by difficulties such as the refusal 
of the Criddle proposals, the Israeli dumping of saline water in the Jordan, and the Arab 
Summits.259
The new phase Davies envisioned would not require a sharp break with the Johnston 
plan, but a shift in emphasis. Davies still believed that certain elements could be used as a 
“standard of judgment”.
  
260 In its entirety, however, the Johnston plan was not ideal. As an 
example Davies referred to the Israeli attempt to justify salt dumping and to seek US support 
for it with the Johnston plan in hand. This, and other attempts for the Jordan River riparian 
states to use the plan to force the US to support positions they did not actually support, was a 
problem with the continued usage of the plan as it was.261
In addition, Davies believed that the technical aspect of the Johnston plan, what the 
US had been clinging to once the refugee approach had proven difficult to pursue, was 
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gradually becoming outdated. As time passed, the technicians had become aware that many of 
the Johnston estimates of capacity were wrong. Further, the countries affected by the Johnston 
plan had developed in the almost ten years that had passed since the Johnston plan 
negotiations stranded. The Johnston plan allocations were calculated on the basis of potential 
agricultural use alone, but with an increased industrialization and urbanization of the Middle 
Eastern countries, their needs had changed accordingly. Thus the Johnston plan allocations 
were no longer valid.262
Davies also addressed the question of initiating a new approach to the Jordan waters 
problem. The situation had changed so that there was a “new set of checks and balances” 
where both the Arabs and the Israelis were forced to show more constraint than before. This 
would become a “real check on Israel’s taking off too much water”. Davies nevertheless 
expected difficulties for agreement on a level of details, and any new approach risked 
breaking down like the Johnston plan had. In order to avoid such a breakdown, Davies 
favoured that the US allowed certain diversions outside the Johnston plan allocations as long 
as they were reasonably equitable.
 
263
Davies found that the Johnston plan continued to be the “best measure of a fair 
division of the Jordan’s waters”, but certain departures were inevitable. Further 
recommendations included that the US would not tolerate so-called “spite diversion”, 
meaning diversion that was not strictly necessary, but that would hurt other riparian states’ 
diversion possibilities. Davies advocated that the US should try to “divert” the water issues 
into international forums whenever possible. While the United States should continue to 
support both the Jordanian and Israeli projects, they should do so without trying to force 
further Johnston plan commitments, and without associating the US with controversial issues 
such as the Yarmouk summer diversion and Israeli saline dumping.
  
264
Davies wanted continued US adherence to the Johnston plan, and he believed “some 
form of international supervision [of the Jordan waters division] remains an ideal we should 
not abandon.” However, he wanted to restrict the US usage of the plan to only those fields 
where it was strictly essential, and he warned against giving the Johnston plan and US 
involvement in Jordan waters issues an exaggerated status.
 
265
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While the emphasis put on the Johnston plan indeed receded somewhat after this, it 
was not abandoned as such. The US State Department officials and Foreign Service officers 
continued to refer to it as a yardstick and as the best available alternative. But there appeared 
to be a wider acceptance for the possibility that alternative options and perhaps even US 
dissociation might become realistic with time. In an orientation to the US Embassy in 
Lebanon shortly after Davies’ memo, for instance, it was ascertained that the US government 
would not insist on the Johnston plan’s validity forever, but for the time being it remained the 
most realistic alternative to govern the Jordan waters problem. The fear of the US government 
was that without the Johnston plan chaos would reign as every riparian attempted to divert as 
much water as possible without any consideration for its neighbours.266
New Wave of Hostilities 
 However, even if 
several of them technically stuck to the plan, considerations for their neighbours did not 
appear to be the guiding principle for any of the Middle Eastern states involved in the Jordan 
waters dispute.  
The second summit convening the Arab League chiefs of state took place in September 1964. 
The atmosphere from the first summit had not changed – the Arab leaders confirmed their 
water diversion plan, and their joint efforts to eliminate Israel.267
In the spring of 1965, a new wave of violence as a result of the conflict over shared 
water resources shook the Middle East. This time the Americans worried about an Israeli 
attack rather than an Arab one. After the Arab summit the tables had turned. The Americans 
no longer expected the Arabs to attack Israel as a result of the threat posed by the Israeli 
diversion project. Israel too, seemed less worried about an Arab attack and more worried 
about the Arab diversion plans.
  
268 Instead, there was reason to expect that the Israelis were 
considering a pre-emptive strike. Talk of military action increasingly became a topic in Israel, 
even publicly and in official circles.269 The Americans warned their Israeli contacts about 
countering the Arab diversion plans with military means. The Arab plan could not be seen as 
a justification for aggression, and the US government would “not condone or support the use 
of force in this matter.”270
The Israeli point of view was that the Arab plan would deprive them of significant 
amounts of water, and thus strike at “a vital Israeli national interest”. According to Levi 
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Eshkol, Israeli Prime Minister since Ben-Gurion’s retirement in 1963, the Jordan River was 
“as dear to Israelis as the blood in their veins”.271 Further, the Israelis had no doubt that the 
Arabs would carry out their diversion plans, regardless of technical difficulties or cooperation 
problems. Hence the Israelis did not share the US view that the Arabs might be constructing 
unviable plans for political gain. Third, the Israeli view was that the Arabs simply could not 
“get away with it”. The logical conclusion of this, from an Israeli point of view, was that 
Israel must have free hands in using force if they judged it to be necessary.272
A further reason Israel might want to use force in this matter, the American Embassy 
in Tel Aviv speculated, was an increased fear in Israel that their deterrent capacity was not as 
intimidating to the Arabs as it once had been. By striking down on the Arabs, Israel might 
reinstate this capacity. Seeing as the Americans specifically sought to avoid Israeli (or 
otherwise) use of force in the Middle East, this was another discrepancy between the Israelis 
and the Americans. What the Americans came to suspect, however, was that Israel might be 
bluffing. It seemed unlikely considering previous experience that the Israelis had not realized 
that the Americans, as well as the French and the British, would strongly discourage an attack. 
Trying to explain the Israeli action, the State Department officials wondered if Israel had a 
secret agenda. The best guess the Americans had was that Israel was either hoping to 
stimulate some kind of tripartite action, where the British and French would cooperate with 
the Americans to avoid Arab hostility; or that the Israelis were simply preparing their friends 
for an attack so that they, while disapproving, might not react as strongly.
  
273
The Americans also speculated whether the Israelis were looking for an opportunity to 
start a larger war. Syria, Jordan and Lebanon could all be targeted if Israel sought to use the 
water conflict as an excuse to go to war. Further, Israel might be able to get their worst 
 The second 
option seems more plausible, both because it was doubtful whether the Israeli warnings and 
hints were as coherent and planned as such an option might suggest; and because the Israelis 
often did not want outside intervention in their affairs. Therefore it sounded a lot more 
realistic that the Israeli threat to attack was real enough (after all, they did attack a mere two 
years later), but that what they had learned from the 1956 war was not to keep their American 
friends in the dark. 
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enemy, Egypt, in the mix. “The temptation to strike at the U.A.R.’s forces in Sinai while they 
are depleted because of the Yemen campaign must be great.”274
The Americans were convinced, however, that the Arabs were bluffing about the 
intention of going through with their diversion schemes. Certain elements of the Arab 
diversion schemes were so obviously exposed to Israeli military attack or sabotage that it 
seemed unlikely that they were not merely attempts to provoke the Israelis. Such a 
provocation might put the Arabs in a victim position, which might be favourable politically. 
At the same time, several of the Arab projects were already started. Thus the speculations that 
they were not serious were questionable, and the Americans admitted they could not be 
accepted as irrefutable.
  
275 Regardless of whether the Arabs states or Israel or all of them were 
bluffing, there was still reason for concern in the US. Beliefs of a linkage between Arab 
nationalism and communism were flaring again, and the Americans feared the Arabs were 
moving closer to the Soviet Union than they had been in a decade.276
The American position was disturbing to the Israeli government. The Israeli 
representative in Washington, Mordechai Gazit, approached the US State Department on 
several occasions, worrying about whether the US position to Israel was changing. 
Specifically, the Israelis wanted to make sure that the US commitment to the Johnston plan 
was as it had been. The US government, however, had by then developed a considerable 
ambivalence with regards to the Johnston plan. While still the best existing plan for water 
development in the Middle East, the Johnston plan was causing problems for the Americans. 
First of all, forcefully demanding the need for all the riparian states to keep in consideration a 
plan they had all rejected ten years earlier was not unproblematic, and it did not contribute to 
an improvement of relations with the Arab states. Secondly, certain aspects of the plan made 
it difficult for the Americans to make individual judgments in some of the more controversial 
water development plans.
 The threat of a 
superpower war in the Middle East was as unappealing to the Americans as it had been a 
decade earlier.  
277
Secretary Rusk wanted to know the Israeli reaction to what they perceived as a change 
in the US policy. The US could not support the Israeli desire for carte blanche for pre-
emptive strike, but if the US policy towards the Jordan waters question in general had 
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changed, Rusk wanted to know what the Israelis thought.278 In addition, a clarification was in 
order. If the US really was retreating from its commitments to Israel, this was a serious matter 
and definitely not a decision that could be made on a low level in the State Department. In a 
review of the commitments the US had given over several years in support of the Israeli water 
policy, Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot ascertained that in effect the US was supporting 
Israel’s projects. In his opinion this should continue, but he warned against unconditional US 
support for Israel in the Jordan waters question. It would be better to stick to the reservations 
already made. He also emphasized that it would be preferable to carry on with the diplomacy 
exercised on the Arab countries. Talbot underscored that this hardly had produced any 
miracles, but he believed it had had some effect. The American efforts, however, had not been 
helped by Israeli “saber-rattling”.279
One potential way of diminishing the risk of armed conflict in the water dispute was to 
take the matter to the UN. This possibility was examined by the US State Department, but 
there were a number of reasons why this was not the most desirable solution. First of all, 
neither the Arabs nor the Israelis wanted a United Nations involvement in the dispute over 
Jordan waters. The most important reason on both sides seemed to be fear of not coming out 
of a potential UN handling as the victor. Secondly, the US expected that a Security Council 
resolution favouring Israel might trigger a Soviet veto. Regardless of this, a handling of the 
matter in the UN was far favourable to another war in the Middle East, especially considering 
that this might lead to a larger confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. Therefore 
if the situation became more precarious, it should be addressed to the Security Council.
 
280
On 22 April 1965 a meeting between Phillips Talbot and Israeli Foreign Minister 
Golda Meir took place in Jerusalem. Talbot was touring the Middle East, and visiting Israel 
after having been to several Arab countries first. His impression from his meetings with Arab 
leaders was that they were making “rather energetic efforts” of convincing him that the Arab 
water diversion projects did not exceed the Johnston plan.
 
281
Meir dismissed this and instead indicated that she believed the Arab unity was 
withering. For instance she believed Lebanon’s participation in the diversion project had been 
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the result of fear for other Arab states.282 According to Talbot, Nasser had in his conversation 
with him been absolutely clear that he did not accept the Johnston plan. He remained firm in 
his claim that there was an Arab plan and that the Arabs intended to carry it out. Talbot’s 
reply to this had been that the US assessment of the reasonableness of such a plan would be 
whether it was in accordance with the allocations made in the Johnston plan.283
Golda Meir, however, did not trust Nasser’s intentions. According to her, the Egyptian 
President claimed that the water the Arabs planned to divert would not exceed the Johnston 
plan allocations, but if this was the case, “then it was a crime to waste so much money and 
manpower and to risk the peace in the area by engaging in the diversion.” Meir believed this 
proved that the Arab diversion only made sense if what Nasser said in public, as opposed to 
what had been said to Talbot in secret, was the goal – that the real aim of the Arab water 
diversion was to cut off Israel’s water sources. She refused to believe that Nasser could 
possibly think that Israel would stand idly by and watch this happen. Her judgment clearly 
was that the Arabs were trying to provoke Israel to attack. Meir seemed more than happy to 
respond to this in a forceful manner: She wanted to know when the US would allow Israel to 
“take a little action in order to prevent a bigger war later”.
  
284
Meir believed Lebanon was the key to solve the problem. However, she did not have 
any confidence in playing it nice. She believed that the US and the UK should stop reassuring 
Lebanon that they were warning Israel against the use of force. This way, she believed, 
Lebanon would worry Israel might attack, which would make it easier for the Lebanese to 
resist Egyptian pressure and oppose the Arab diversion project. Instead, “[i]t would be much 
better if the Lebanese were told Washington and London believed the Israelis would shoot if 
the diversion work were continued.”
 
285
In spite of her sabre rattling, Golda Meir stressed that Israel wanted a peaceful solution 
to the water issue. “The US should never mind what some people here said. Mrs. Meir 
supposed that Moshe Dayan was a bad boy, but she was confident that even he wanted a 
peaceful solution.”
  
286
Talbot did not appear to share Meir’s enthusiasm for threatening Lebanon. On the 
contrary, he believed that it was risky to do so. Lebanese leaders were fearful for Israel’s 
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threats, and the more imminent the danger of an Israeli attack seemed, the greater the risk for 
instability and division in Lebanon. This might lead to increased pressure from Arab 
nationalists, and increased chance of intervention by foreign Arab armies to protect Lebanon 
from Israel.287
Talbot conveyed to Meir that the Arabs feared Israeli expansion, both geographically 
and in population. Meir replied to this that “only the Herut Party talked about expansion and 
even they knew it was a lot of nonsense.”
 
288 To this, Meir added rather sarcastically: “The 
Arab fear of expansion made as much sense as would an Israeli demand that Egypt institute 
strict birth control.” Talbot tried to assure Meir that the Arab diversion would not affect Israel 
for a long time yet.289
Golda Meir indicated that the “point of no return” would be if the Lebanese “crossed 
the border”, meaning if they linked their diversion project up with the Syrian one. Under the 
Israeli interpretation of the Johnston plan, any cross-border cooperation of Jordan waters 
diversion was illegal. More importantly, perhaps, was the fact that a Syrian-Lebanese 
cooperation might have the possibility of exceeding the Johnston plan allocations. The Israelis 
would not tolerate this. From an Israeli point of view, the basic problem remained: “Israel 
could not allow the Arab diversion work to go on.” Again Meir emphasized that Israel wanted 
a peaceful solution. Even though Israel had been advised to take the matter to the UN, this 
was not an option Meir favoured because there was no guarantee that Israel would get its way 
with the UN.
 
290
A third Arab summit was arranged in September 1965. Here the Secretary General of 
the Arab League announced that the Arab diversion work had ceased because of Israeli 
diversion. This caused a split among the Arabs. While the Syrian delegate wanted to continue 
opposing Israel on this matter, Egyptian President Nasser put his foot down. According to 
historian Avi Shlaim, this was a de facto admission that Israel had won the water war.
  
291
Still Water? 
  
The Americans continued to question the applicability of the Johnston plan. One of the main 
arguments the US had used with the Kingdom of Jordan was that the Johnston plan restrained 
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Israel. However, this seemed to have lost its momentum. The Kingdom of Jordan would soon 
be unable to use the water in the lower Jordan and refused to take its allocation directly from 
the Israeli-controlled Lake Tiberias.292 Consulting Wayne Criddle again, the Americans 
hoped to hear his assessment of the situation. Criddle argued that the US ought to stick to the 
Johnston plan. Not only did he think it still was relevant; he also believed that abandoning the 
plan at this time would “undermine the progress made thus far towards rational development 
of the river system”.293
This positive view of the Johnston plan was not shared by everyone. Dr. Mohammed 
Ahmed Salim, the Egyptian water expert who was the chief Arab negotiator during the 
Johnston negotiations, believed the Johnston plan was “dead”. He considered Eric Johnston’s 
failure to convince the Arabs that the Israelis would not take water out of the basin and divert 
it to the Negev the crucial point when the Johnston plan ceased to be of importance, 
regardless of the fact that it had been used by the Americans as a yardstick for a decade after 
this.
  
294
Inside the US State Department the belief in the Johnston plan was also withering. So 
far it had rested on a decade-long claim that the plan had stranded on political issues after a 
virtual agreement on the technical issues. However, Oliver L. Troxel, Jr., who was one of the 
participants of the 1955 negotiations, interjected that the Johnston plan hardly could be 
employed in this way. According to Troxel, the Johnston plan allocations were intertwined to 
the extent that a change in one of them could affect all the others. Thus it was significant that 
agreement on all technical issues was not reached with all the participants. Even though it was 
also Troxel’s judgment that technical issues had ceased to be of consideration when the 
negotiations stalled, his point of view regarding the interdependence of the technical details 
fundamentally alters the notion of its applicability.
  
295 His conclusion was something that the 
State Department in the previous ten years perhaps had failed to realize the full extent of:  
“The Johnston Plan cannot be thought of as an agreement among the parties since no 
agreement was reached.”[my emphasis]296
While the Americans clearly did not want armed conflict over the shared water 
resources in the Jordan River basin, they did not make any convincing attempts to maintain 
the relative calm of the period, other than exercising diplomacy whenever confrontation 
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seemed likely. They certainly did not attempt to create comprehensive peace. The US 
proposals for a solution of the water dispute were all of a technical manner, and the main 
consideration was to keep any water development schemes in accordance with the outdated 
Johnston plan, simply because there existed nothing better. After the negotiations stalled in 
1955, there were no further attempts to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict by use of water 
cooperation schemes, as had been done with the original Johnston plan.  
The main problem with the usage and applicability of the Johnston plan ten years after 
it originally failed seemed to be that both its supporters and its opponents had fundamentally 
different ideas about what the plan involved, what it did not involve, and to what extent the 
Middle Eastern countries were to be held accountable for it. With such a loose framework the 
Johnston plan in reality could not function as a yardstick for prosperous use and division of 
water in the Jordan basin. Consequently, for the Americans to claim that it was must either be 
considered extremely naïve, or the Johnston plan became another one of the many initiatives 
within the Arab-Israeli conflict that stranded because the tough decisions that were required 
were not made.  
To what extent could the Johnston plan have been said to have been a peace initiative 
post-1955? If including the word “comprehensive”, the answer is simple: not at all. After its 
initial negotiation rounds the Johnston plan did not take any other conflict areas into account, 
and thus it was only a plan attempting to divide the scarce water resources in the Jordan basin 
among the riparian states. In effect, the plan did function as “a goal, something to aim at”, 
seeing as both the Arab states and Israel made a point of showing the Americans that their 
diversion projects were within the limits of the Johnston plan. The Americans also used this 
deliberately as a diplomatic strategy to avoid confrontation. Having the plan as a yardstick, 
however inefficient, might have helped them to have something to go by when performing 
this diplomacy. However, in the long run the Johnston plan had little effect, both as a water 
sharing scheme, and as a peace initiative. The conflict between the Middle Eastern states 
resulted in another war, and the water conflict in the early 1960s was one of several issues 
that were integral to the conflict spiral that eventually triggered the 1967 war. The increased 
regional tension the water conflicts led to was part of what made the 1967 war inevitable.297
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Water was, however, only one reason for the increased conflict. The fact that the Americans, 
who had an interest of peace in the region, failed to link the water issue up to other conflict 
points, may have contributed to, rather than avoided war.  
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Despite this, the Middle Eastern states seemed less interested in the issue after 1965. 
There no longer were any Israeli delegations marching into meeting with State Department 
officials, demanding a clarification on the US position towards the Johnston plan. However, 
even if the “water wars” had calmed down sufficiently to no longer be of much concern to 
either Israel or the US government, incidents connected to the shared water resources in the 
Jordan Valley continued to a smaller degree between 1965 and 1967. Attacks and instability 
on Israel’s borders, especially towards Syria, but also along the Lebanese and Jordanian 
borders, persisted, several of which were directed at diversion equipment or water 
development sites.298
After the 1967 war, Israel gained new water resources through its occupation of the 
Golan Heights and the West Bank. The Jordan River headwaters, which had been the source 
of much of the conflict between the riparian states, now almost exclusively ran through 
Israeli-controlled territory. The geopolitical changes of the 1967 war thus had a profound 
effect on the water wars in the Middle East. For Israel’s part, the problem over shared water 
resources was now largely solved, since the resources were no longer shared.
   
299
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The Palestinian Refugee Problem 
The Palestinian refugee problem has been on the Middle East agenda for all the US 
administrations since it originated as a result of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948-1949. The 
refugee problem figured in reports and plans either as a separate issue or as a part of attempts 
and suggestions for larger settlements. For a number of reasons the refugee problem was 
never solved. Initially, the Eisenhower administration had hoped that the development of the 
Jordan waters under Eric Johnston’s plan would open up new areas where the refugees could 
be settled.300
In what ways did the American government take part in the attempts of solving the 
Palestinian Refugee question between 1956 and 1967? Was the US patronage for The United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and participation in PCC part of any 
comprehensive peace agreements?  
 When this did not happen, the following years were largely spent reviewing 
temporary arrangements without any major commitments to lasting solutions. The Kennedy 
administration launched a new initiative through the once-again-revamped Palestine 
Conciliation Commission (PCC), where Special Representative Joseph E. Johnson embarked 
on several missions to the Middle East, trying to shift some ground in the difficult refugee 
question. Once this initiative failed, however, the remaining Kennedy period and the 
subsequent administration under Lyndon B. Johnson were characterized by feeble attempts at 
approaching the refugee problem and more enthusiastic ones in trying to pull out of any 
responsibility for the refugees and the Arab-Israeli conflict in general.  
Resettlement versus repatriation 
Since the 1948 war, there were two main options considered for solution of the refugee 
problem: resettlement in the Arab countries surrounding Israel, or repatriation within the 
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territories occupied by Israel.301 In the United Nations General Assembly resolution 194 (III) 
of 11 December 1948, paragraph 11, it was established that the refugees who wished to return 
to their homes in former Palestine should be allowed to do so “at the earliest practicable date”, 
and if they chose not to return, they would receive compensation.302 The problem was that the 
Arab and Israeli governments interpreted the UN resolution differently. The Israelis would 
only accept negotiations of the refugee problem as part of a larger settlement, while the Arabs 
refused to negotiate until the refugee problem was settled.303
US policy had from the beginning been that a compromise would be the only viable 
solution. If Israel agreed to allow a limited, yet significant number of refugees into their 
territory, the belief was that the Arab countries would be willing to resettle the bulk of the 
refugees. In turn the Americans hoped this would facilitate an overall solution of the other 
unresolved questions of the conflict. The main obstacle to this strategy was that the 
Americans failed to realize that Israel was not prepared to allow any refugees back – 
especially not before an overall settlement was in place.
  
304
Barring the Israeli resistance to the idea of repatriation, however, there continued to be 
problems with the resettlement of the refugees in the mid-1950s. One of the recurring 
dilemmas with the refugee problem was finding a suitable host country for resettlement of the 
refugees that would not be allowed repatriation to Israel. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
was logistically the easiest option because many of the refugees were already Jordanian 
citizens, but economically this was difficult since Jordan did not have the capacity to support 
the refugees. In Syria most of the refugees were already economically resettled, but the 
Americans did not consider this country for further negotiations about resettlement, most 
likely because of the strained political climate that existed between Syria and the West. In 
Lebanon there was already a potentially volatile situation between the Christian and Moslem 
population, and thus any suggestions to resettle the refugees there were subject to Lebanese 
criticism of upsetting the already fragile balance. And, according to a US estimate, Egypt 
would not be willing to facilitate water for the refugees in the Sinai Peninsula, and the Nile 
Valley was already too crowded to be considered. Thus it was logistically impossible to 
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resettle any significant number of refugees in Egypt. In addition, Egypt demanded that Israel 
accept repatriation before it was willing to consider resettlement for the refugees.305
Remaining was Iraq, which seemed like the most promising prospect, but here also 
there were problems. Iraq already had a significant portion of its population living under 
strained conditions. Further, the cultural and climate differences between Iraq and the areas 
the refugees came from were significant. Finally, like Egypt, Iraq demanded that before it was 
willing to accept negotiations about resettlement, Israel had to accept the principle of 
repatriation. Several suggestions that were made to the State Department therefore considered 
various approaches to win over the Iraqi government. Eric Johnston continued to encourage 
the Department to revive the Jordan water development program, and one of his suggestions 
was to link this with a proposal for resettling refugees in Iraq. Resettling refugees in Iraq was 
also at the core of an attempt of quiet diplomacy performed by Secretary General of the UN 
Dag Hammarskjöld. Finally Israel proposed that the US use its recently improved relationship 
with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to persuade Jordan to help convince Iraq to resettle 
refugees.
 
306
Refugees in the Cold War  
  
The primary US objective in the Middle East was “dislodging the Soviet Union from the 
foothold it is now in the process of acquiring and subsequently denying to it access to the 
area, while detaining the area resources, especially petroleum, for the West.”307 Peacemaking 
was not on the agenda. The Cold War definitely was. Even if the Eisenhower administration 
did not want to take an active part in attempts at achieving comprehensive peace in the 
conflict, the refugee problem continued to be a matter demanding their attention, both because 
of the magnitude of the problem and because of its persistence.308 The refugee problem was 
considered to be the main cause of tension between the Arab states and Israel. In addition, the 
US government had for years worried that the refugees might be susceptible to Soviet 
influence. There were thus concerns for the lack of solution of the refugee problem both in 
Congress and in the general public.309
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report was drafted with the intent of exploring the options the Americans had with regards to 
the refugee question.  
In this report two cycles of suggestions to the solution of the refugee problem were 
identified. First there had been attempts at solving the problem isolated from the rest of the 
conflict, through the establishment of UNRWA and the Johnston plan. The other cycle 
consisted of attempts at solving the refugee problem within the context of the general Arab-
Israeli conflict, where the refugee problem was seen as one of the many obstacles to 
comprehensive peace. Secretary Dulles’s speech on 26 August 1955, which was largely a 
public version of the Alpha plan, was an example of the latter. Due to the relative failure of 
any attempts to create comprehensive peace in the Middle East, however, the trend seemed to 
be returning to the first position – problem management tackling the refugee problem as a 
separate issue.310
Reconsidering UNRWA 
 Comprehensive peace was no longer a priority.  
Because there had been hope that the refugee problem might be solved as an integral part of 
the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian refugees were not made subject to any of the 
permanent UN refugee institutions. Instead, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA) was established in 1949 to supply the refugees with shelter, food, medical care 
and education. UNRWA started its work in the field in the Middle East on 1 May 1950.311 
UNRWA had relative success in terms of increasing the standard of living for the 
Palestinians, but it did not help solve the refugee problem. In addition, UNRWA was created 
as a temporary arrangement until the difficult refugee problem could be resolved. Since Israel 
and the Arab states continued to disagree on this matter, and external actors such as the 
United States remained unable to negotiate a compromise, UNRWA gradually became a de 
facto permanent institution.312
UNRWA was becoming a headache for the US government in the late 1950s. The 
initial mandate consisted of two tasks: first, UNRWA should carry out relief and works 
programmes in cooperation with local governments; secondly, the organization should 
cooperate with the Middle Eastern governments to prepare them for the termination of 
international support for the refugees.
 
313
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transitional agency. Since the refugee problem remained unsolved, however, the UNRWA 
mandate was repeatedly renewed.314
The US government was quite satisfied with UNRWA’s performance. The 
organization was efficient; the medical and educational programs had been successful; and 
despite the fact that the US was decidedly the largest contributor, UNRWA had served its 
purpose as a means of insulating the US from “the difficult consequences which would ensue 
if we were directly involved in a relief program.”
  
315
Nevertheless, the Americans feared that UNRWA had outplayed its role. First of all, 
there was concern that the “temporary” institution was becoming permanent. UNRWA had 
not been able to carry out any significant resettlement projects, and without any realistic 
prospects of this happening soon, chances were that the need for a financial support system 
like UNRWA would never end. Secondly, many of the Palestinians who had left the refugee 
camps, and thus actually had been resettled in Arab states, continued to receive UNRWA aid. 
On top of the natural growth in the refugee population, this meant that the relief agency’s 
continuous need for funding increased.
 In other words, UNRWA had been a 
successful political decoy for the United States.  
316 Third, the Americans feared that by letting 
UNRWA handle the refugees the local governments might become “insulated” from the 
seriousness of the situation. This, the Americans speculated, might imply that the Arab 
governments stalled the decision of resettling the refugees.317
Taking the above into account made the US contribution of 70 per cent of UNRWA’s 
funds seem like an increasingly difficult endeavour. Congress was already sceptical towards 
granting the vast sum of money the US spent on UNRWA, and the prospect of a steadily and 
permanently increasing budget made a continued US commitment of this scale unlikely. In 
addition the other contributing states were also finding it gradually more difficult to 
contribute.
  
318
The logical outcome of weighing the cost against the benefits seemed to be that 
UNRWA could not continue in its original form. The agency’s mandate was set to expire on 
30 June 1960, and the State Department’s preference was to terminate the relief agency by not 
renewing the mandate when it was renegotiated. Until this expiration, however, it was decided 
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to keep the US funding, as promised, at 70 per cent. The fact that the termination of UNRWA 
would not also mean a termination of the refugee problem was seen as unfortunate, but 
hopefully something that could be resolved by a transfer of certain ad hoc funding 
mechanisms to the local Arab governments.319 Due to the American belief that the 
organizational structure of UNRWA was making Arab cooperation difficult, they considered 
reorganizing UNRWA to a local-based institution where the Arab governments would be 
more involved.320
In addition to the idea of transferring UNRWA’s relief duties to the local Arab 
governments by the time UNRWA’s mandate expired, there were proposals that called for 
Israeli cooperation in accepting the principle of repatriation. In reality, however, the number 
of refugees Israel was supposed to repatriate was set at an upper limit of 100 000.
  
321 This was 
the same amount of refugees Israel had indicated it would be willing to repatriate late in the 
negotiations in 1949.322 The offer had been “too little, too late” then, and after almost a 
decade in which the total number of refugees had continued to grow, it was unlikely that the 
Arabs would be any more willing to accept that same amount.323
The US State Department still favoured the termination of the UNRWA mandate as 
renegotiation was drawing nearer. The Americans feared that while UNRWA had ensured a 
better situation for the refugees, it had also contributed to a protraction of the refugee 
problem. As long as UNRWA was interposed between the refugees and the local 
governments, the Middle Eastern states could claim that the refugees were a UN 
responsibility. This way they had no incentive to solve the problem, and thus were not 
prepared to cooperate with UNRWA or other actors to ensure a solution of the refugee 
problem.
 
324
Because the Americans believed UNRWA obstructed a solution of the refugee 
problem, they deduced that the termination of UNRWA’s mandate might speed up the process 
for a solution of the refugee problem. However, this led to considerable international concern 
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about what would happen with the refugees until a solution could be reached, or if none was 
reached at all.325
The UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, was sceptical towards an abolition of 
UNRWA. Considering the low standard of living in many of the Arab countries, both the 
refugees and the local population of the Arab world would suffer considerably if the financial 
support were to end. He feared that this might send the Arabs into armed upheaval. 
Hammarskjöld’s recommendation was an infinite continuation of UNRWA’s mandate.
  
326 The 
Secretary General personally told President Eisenhower that he preferred a permanent 
solution to the refugee problem, but that he believed UNRWA should remain in its current 
form until the refugees were satisfyingly integrated. The American view remained that they 
did not consider UNRWA’s indefinite existence beneficial to anyone – especially the United 
States – but that they would be willing to assist the Arab states if they would carry some of 
the weight themselves.327
The director of UNRWA, Dr. John H. Davis, also discussed his concern with State 
Department officials. In reply to State Department’s worries about convincing the US 
Congress of further financing UNRWA, Dr. Davis supplied the Department with the 
argument that Congressional funding of UNRWA really was about funding Middle Eastern 
stability.
  
328 The Lebanese ambassador to the US appealed directly to the American UN 
delegation and the Secretary of State, in hope of securing their support for the continued 
existence of UNRWA, and representatives from several other Arab states also contacted the 
US delegates with the same concern.329
After the discussion with the UN Secretary General, the UNRWA director and the 
Arab representatives, the US was willing to reassure those who worried that the US agreed 
that international assistance to the Palestinian refugees would have to continue after June 
1960. Gradually it became clear that it was probable that UNRWA’s mandate would be 
renewed. The Americans gradually managed to move towards a compromise, however. The 
draft resolution eventually supported by the Americans renewed UNRWA, but for a limited 
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time.330 The Americans accepted this, but remained worried that Congress might cut off the 
economic supply.331
International pressure made it apparent to US officials that it was no longer in their 
best interest to keep insisting on a termination of UNRWA. The mandate was renewed for 
three years in the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1959. The vote was unanimous, apart 
from Israel which abstained. The same resolution called upon the PCC to “secure the 
implementation” of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194, which in effect was a 
reminder to the PCC of its mandate to seek a permanent solution to the Palestine refugee 
problem and a confirmation of the UN’s interest in doing so.
 
332
Eisenhower’s Lack of Faith 
  
After the failure of the 1949 Lausanne conference the Palestine Conciliation Commission 
(PCC) was considered de facto dead by many. The PCC suffered a gradual demise, and for 
the majority of the 1950s and 1960s, the PCC largely was dormant in its primary task as UN 
negotiator in the Arab-Israeli conflict.333 The PCC had been instructed to “take steps to assist 
the [Israeli and Arab] Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of 
all questions outstanding between them.”334
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did not improve the situation for the majority of the refugees.335
Despite its own prominent membership, the US government believed the PCC had 
outplayed its role. The verdict was clear: 
 There can be little doubt that 
the PCC had lost much of its importance.  
The United States would press at a reasonably early date (depending on current 
developments and reactions of other member states) for adoption of the resolution 
which it tabled at the Emergency General Assembly Session which called for the 
establishment of a negotiating committee to replace the moribund and ineffective 
Palestine Conciliation Commission.336
The PCC was considered ineffective and outdated. Despite this, State Department 
officials often referred to the PCC as one of the many peace initiatives the US continued to 
contribute to in their external correspondence.
  
337
The Eisenhower administration signed off without much hope for progress in the 
Middle East. It was believed that there was little the Americans could do so late in a 
presidential period, especially with the Middle Eastern states shying away from any 
commitments. Israel, it was believed, favoured status quo over a solution – at least any 
solution the situation allowed it to hope for. The Americans assumed the Israelis were 
awaiting the US presidential election in hope that a US administration more favourable to 
Israel would come to power. In the meantime, the Americans could only observe that “Israel 
[...] constantly proclaims its desire for ‘peace’, a process which it envisages as the forced 
appearance of the Arabs at a conference table.” The Americans did not believe that the 
Israelis thought this was a realistic position, but they thought that the Jewish state continued 
this policy because it made for a good public display of cooperativeness.
 The PCC was convenient to refer to 
whenever accusations were raised that the US was not doing enough in the Middle East, but 
for all intents and purposes, the US desperately wanted to get out.  
338
The Eisenhower administration, constantly aware and afraid of the Soviet presence in 
the region, also estimated that the Soviet Union wanted status quo. A settlement of the 
conflict would only serve to reduce the Arab support for the Soviet Union, as they would no 
longer have such an acute need for arms, the Americans assessed. There were several of the 
leaders of what the Americans considered friendly Arab states who had come to the US with 
hopes of a Palestine settlement. In the current climate of intra-Arab conflicts and Israeli lack 
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of will to compromise, however, the Eisenhower administration did not think the time was 
right for such an effort. In order to achieve a solution of the Palestine refugee problem, the US 
government believed “a declaration of honest willingness on the part of Israel to repatriate a 
substantial number of refugees” must be the first step. In other words, not much had changed 
since 1949. The Americans believed that an Israeli concession might be achievable, but the 
timing was essential. In early 1958, the timing was not the best.339
In light of this, there was nothing that could convince Eisenhower that the time was 
right to initiate any further efforts for a resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem. The 
overall conclusion was that any US approach to the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict or any 
significant aspect of it, such as the refugee problem, would fail. The Americans feared that a 
misguided approach at the wrong time might risk US interests in the area, and endanger the 
relative calm following the 1956 war.
 
340
Kennedy’s New Approach 
 In the end, Eisenhower’s solution was to try to 
disengage from the Arab-Israeli conflict altogether.  
When John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, the US Middle East policy was one of many areas 
where he wanted to leave a trace. As a way of introducing the new president and his visions 
for US presence in the Middle East, Kennedy sent personalized letters to each of the Arab 
heads of state a few months after his inauguration. His main message was that of friendship 
and cooperation, and he specifically addressed his interest in resolving difficult issues such as 
the Jordan water development and the Palestine refugee problem.341 The purpose of the letters 
was to underscore the balanced and unbiased policy Kennedy wished to approach the Middle 
East with. A new, quiet-diplomacy approach through the PCC was in the making, and it was 
fundamental for its success to secure a certain level of Arab support.342
These letters, and later a conversation with Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, 
were the starting point for a new initiative that the Kennedy administration hoped could help 
shift some ground in the refugee question. Kennedy’s motivation was not just to fulfil election 
campaign promises. There was also hope that a break-through in the refugee question could 
dissolve the deadlock in the rest of the conflict. As a fortunate side effect, any progress in the 
Middle East would mean a smaller risk of extremists gaining ground in the region. Further, 
the Americans still hoped progress regarding the refugee problem would make it possible to 
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end the US’s considerable contribution to UNRWA, and with this it was plausible that a 
gradual US disengagement from the financial aspect of the conflict was within reach.343
The US administration continued to try to convince the Israelis that a symbolic 
gesture, such as Israeli acceptance of a repatriation of a small number of refugees, might be 
enough to shift the psychological barrier that hindered Arab willingness to resettle the 
majority of the refugees. However, this was not an option for Israel. The persistent Israeli 
position was that the refugee question could only be handled under a broader peace settlement 
– or that it would solve itself if a peace settlement was in place. Israel’s foreign minister 
Golda Meir felt that the Israeli willingness to negotiate an overall peace agreement was a 
sufficient show of goodwill. Meir refused to agree with the US theory that a symbolic Israeli 
gesture might encourage the Arabs to cooperate.
  
344
Even though the positions seemed uncompromising, the Kennedy administration 
decided to try a cautious approach of quiet diplomacy. Due to the UN reconfirmation of the 
PCC mandate to negotiate a settlement between the Israelis and Arabs, the PCC seemed like 
the right medium through which to launch a refugee initiative.  
 Since the Arabs continued to oppose 
direct negotiations with Israel, this effectively put the refugee question in limbo as well.  
The Johnson Missions 
On 21 August 1961, Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, was appointed by the PCC as a Special Representative to the Middle East 
to “undertake an exploratory mission to the Middle East on the refugee problem”.345 Johnson 
was not formally associated with the US government, but he cooperated closely with the State 
Department in his work for PCC, and it was through the suggestion by the State Department 
that Johnson was chosen, after PCC had initially sought a “neutral” special representative.346
The new mission already encountered problems at the planning stage. When President 
Kennedy introduced the idea of a PCC Special Representative to Israeli Prime Minister David 
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Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister was not overly optimistic with regards to any resolution of 
the refugee question. To Kennedy he blamed “the UAR and any Arabs”, claiming that they 
considered the refugees their “best weapon”.347 Ben-Gurion was hesitant to discuss the PCC 
initiative at all, but he reluctantly agreed that “it is always worth trying”.348
The Americans interpreted Ben-Gurion’s apprehensive admission as a green light. 
However, when the US permanent delegate to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, approached Ben-
Gurion a few days later with more information about the upcoming PCC initiative, it became 
apparent that Ben-Gurion was not on board. The Prime Minister flat-out rejected Stevenson’s 
suggestion that Israel would have to accept some repatriation. He accused Stevenson of 
proposing a completely different scenario than what the President had mentioned.
 
349
The Americans were in disarray. In the State Department they discussed whether Ben-
Gurion’s change of heart had anything to do with him feeling cornered by Stevenson. Some 
suggested that more pressure should be put to bear upon Israel, while others argued that 
enough damage had been done and that applying more pressure on Israel would only make the 
Jewish state more hesitant to cooperate.
  
350
Despite the initial problems, Johnson left for the Middle East on 31 August 1961. He 
visited Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Gaza, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, conducting high-level 
discussions in each city.
 The only thing the Americans did not appear to 
consider was that Ben-Gurion was not all that enthusiastic about the proposal in the first 
place, and that his acceptance in the meeting with Kennedy had only been an agreement that a 
solution to the refugee problem would be favourable. Ben-Gurion never said anything about 
what he thought the solution should be.  
351 Johnson’s meetings in the Middle East were characterized with 
mutual cordiality and respect as a rule, but it was not easy to get any realistic ideas on the 
table. The Lebanese representatives wanted to accept resettlement only within the borders of 
former Palestine. The discussion with David Ben-Gurion was so rough that Johnson 
considered walking out.352
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visit to clarify his position in the Knesset. His speech, and a subsequent Knesset resolution, 
underscored that Israel was not prepared to accept any Palestinian refugees.353
Johnson’s conclusions after his first visit to the Middle East were not optimistic: 
 
It is clear that as matters now stand there is no prospect of an early resolution of the 
Palestine question as a whole and, as can be seen from the preceding section, there are 
many indications that no progress can be made on the Palestine Arab refugee question 
apart from, or in advance of, an over-all settlement.354
However, Johnson’s observation also included that while he had encountered the same 
uncompromising attitudes from the Arab and Israeli leaders as had stranded the refugee 
problem in the first place, he had reason to believe there was willingness in both the Arab and 
Israeli capitals for a step-by-step solution. He believed it would be beneficial to continue with 
a Special Representative approach for at least another year to further explore these 
possibilities. He also stressed that even with a solution in sight, the Palestinian refugees would 
continue to depend on international economic assistance for at least a decade. In tune with 
Johnson’s recommendations, the US United Nations delegation subsequently supported a 
continued PCC mission and a renewal of the UNRWA mandate.
 
355
Johnson presented his draft report to the Israeli and Arab delegations at the UN on 15 
November 1961. The Arab states especially received it unfavourably – not, as one might 
expect, because of its conclusions, but because of the historical section which the Arabs 
considered biased towards Israel. After consideration, Johnson agreed to alter the report by 
removing a significant portion of the historical part. However, by doing so he ran into trouble 
with the Israelis who claimed Johnson was making alterations without their consent. The 
other PCC members, France and Turkey, supported Israel’s claim that the report should be 
altered back, but Johnson refused. It helped very little that US representatives pointed out that 
the changes made did not alter the conclusions of the report. Israeli Foreign Minister Golda 
Meir was particularly annoyed with the alterations. Thus, the Johnson mission had suffered 
another serious blow.
 
356
When the refugee question was up again for debate in the General Assembly, there 
was considerable apprehension in the US State Department. It was expected that both the 
Arabs and the Israelis would make symbolic proposals that would be unacceptable to the 
other party, and thus the United States expected few if any results from the debate.
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predicted, Arabs and Israelis alike proposed resolutions the US quickly dismissed as 
extremes. The only real development in the UN debate on the refugee question, then, was that 
the General Assembly endorsed the PCC and Johnson’s work, regardless of the unenthusiastic 
reception Johnson’s report had received with the Middle Eastern states.358
Johnson left for another trip to the Middle East in April 1962. This time the political 
climate in the region was not as favourable as it had been the previous autumn. There was a 
crisis between Israel and Syria in March 1962, and the Arab countries were going through a 
period of intensified intra-Arab rivalries.
 Thus it was 
decided that the mission should go on.  
359 Johnson’s meetings, too, were more difficult this 
time around. In Tel Aviv the Israelis attempted to discuss specific numbers for how many 
refugees they would be expected to repatriate. Because a fixed number would threaten 
Johnson’s attempt at keeping the negotiations relatively informal, the discussions in Israel 
subsequently stranded at the frequent Israeli fear that allowing any refugees to return might 
threaten Israeli security. In Amman, the Jordanian government had their own set of fears: that 
Israeli aggression threatened the Hashemite Kingdom’s security; and perhaps more 
importantly, that a large amount of the refugees who would not be allowed or who would not 
choose to return to Israel under the Johnson plan would have to be resettled in Jordan.360
Under these difficult circumstances, Johnson’s task seemed impossible. As an 
alternative to giving up completely, however, it was decided not to continue with 
negotiations, but instead formulate a plan in which the Israelis and Arabs could make 
comments.
  
361
The plan that was presented to the Middle Eastern states in the autumn of 1962 
suggested a combination of repatriation and resettlement, determined by the individual 
refugee’s wishes identified in several interview rounds. The interviews would include 
disincentives for returning to Israel to encourage as many as possibly to choose the politically 
simpler option of resettlement. By this technique, it was assumed that only about 1 out of 
every 10 Palestinians would want to return to Israel. Those remaining would be resettled in 
Arab states or elsewhere. The Johnson plan estimated that the settlement of all the registered 
refugees would take five to ten years, and the cost would be divided, with the majority (40 per 
cent) to be covered by Israel, 30 per cent by the United States and the remaining 30 per cent 
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by other nations and private sources.362 Another key element Johnson hoped might lead to 
success was that the Israelis and Arabs did not have to formally agree to the plan as long as 
they did not specifically reject it. It was not going to be promoted as another signed document 
that could cause embarrassment in both Israel and the Arab states, but rather a settlement by 
acquiescence.363
The Americans were aware that achieving such acquiescence would not be easy. 
Firstly, the Arab states were sceptical, both collectively and due to individual concerns. For 
instance, Lebanon worried that it would be forced to resettle a large number of refugees that 
might disturb the already fragile balance between the Christian and Moslem population.
  
364
Secondly, it was becoming clear that Israel did not want any repatriation: 
  
Fundamentally, Israel wants no repatriation of refugees and can be expected to try to 
build resistance among its supporters in this country to any plan involving anything 
but token repatriation.365
Regardless, this did not change the belief that Israel could be persuaded to accept a limited 
number of refugees under the right terms.
 
366
Trying to Strike a Deal 
 As it turned out, Israel never had any intentions 
to accept any repatriation. It was not possible to find the right terms.  
Not willing to accept defeat, the US decided to try to use its own influence with the Israelis. 
In August 1962 Kennedy made a decision to sell Hawk missiles to Israel. This was a request 
the Israelis had already put in early that spring, but the US Departments of State and Defense 
had been debating back and forth whether such a sale was a good idea. Kennedy, like his 
predecessor Eisenhower, had previously denied arms requests from Israel in accordance with 
the outspoken US strategy of limiting a Middle East arms race. Now, however, the option of 
linking the sale of the Hawk missiles to the Johnson plan seemed promising. In utmost secret 
Kennedy dispatched his Deputy Special Counsel, Myer Feldman, to visit Tel Aviv to 
convince Ben-Gurion to accept the Johnson plan with the understanding that this would be the 
precondition for US sale of arms to the Jewish state.367
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Even though the Presidential Emissary initially seemed to have some success, 
Feldman rapidly ran into trouble. The Israelis were hesitant towards the Johnson plan again, 
because of the informality of the acquiescence the plan required. The Israeli fear was that this 
would give the Arabs a pretext to accuse Israel of not implementing the wishes of the refugees 
“when the plan failed.”368 After Feldman’s return, the Israelis continued to resist the Johnson 
plan. And an unexpected problem had arisen: Joseph Johnson and Myer Feldman were not 
saying the same to the Israelis.369
In conversations with Israeli leaders, Feldman had given certain reassurances to the 
Israelis about Israel having the final word on repatriating any refugee. In the meantime, 
Johnson had made some minimal changes in the language of the plan which now included a 
call for “UN impartial arbitration of any conflict over admissibility”.
 
370 Consequently, when 
the official text of Joseph Johnson’s plan was presented to Israel and the Arabs on 10 
September, the Israelis cried out that this new formulation was a threat to their sovereignty. 
The problems made Feldman doubt there was any solution in sight at all, and he called for US 
disengagement.371 Expecting the Johnson plan to fail, another of Kennedy’s advisors, Robert 
W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff, urged the President to give up on the plan, 
and to let it die a natural death. “[L]et [the] Arabs take the onus,” was his advice.372
Further doubts were raised by the other PCC members. The PCC was not prepared to 
endorse the Johnson plan before the Middle Eastern states did, but there had been agreement 
among the members to let Johnson present the plan to the Israelis and the Arab states. The 
terms were that there would be no further negotiations on details as a result of Johnson’s 
presentations, and the plan was also not to be publicized.
 
373
On top of this, the scheme to sell Hawks in exchange for achieving a refugee 
settlement was not working out. On 14 September 1962 the US government made the 
announcement that it was selling the missiles to Israel. The very same day, the Knesset voted 
against the Johnson plan.
  
374
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telegrams in praise of the Johnson plan.”375
No matter how much the Americans supported the Johnson plan, its success had been 
dependent on how it was received among the Middle Eastern states. The Israeli point of view 
had been, or should have been, clear from the start. They did not trust Johnson, they did not 
want to make any agreement without considerable and unrealistic Arab concessions, and they 
were not at all interested in repatriation.
 In reality, the approach had nothing to do with the 
Israeli rejection. The fact was that Israel finally had shown its true colours in lack of intent of 
accepting the Johnson plan.  
376 But the Arabs were not convinced either. Syria 
announced its rejection of the plan on 6 October 1962.377 In Egypt, President Nasser 
considered the Johnson plan too limited for its scope. Because Johnson never was able to 
discuss any actual numbers, Nasser’s estimate that Israel might be willing to repatriate about 
10 000 Palestinian refugees was as good as any. Nasser did not see this as a realistically 
acceptable number for either the refugees or the Arab states.378 The Arab states and the 
refugees believed the Johnson plan too limited. Israel thought it too extensive. Between these 
complete opposites there could be no compromise. A short time after the Johnson plan was 
rejected by Israel, the Arab states made a uniform statement that they did not consider the 
Johnson plan a “suitable framework for a fruitful discussion”.379
The US government had earnestly hoped and believed that Joseph Johnson’s proposals 
would lead to progress in solving the Palestinian refugee problem. They foresaw difficulties 
with both the Arab countries and Israel, but they believed these were issues that could be 
overcome. Unfortunately, they were wrong. The Americans were also wrong in the belief that 
even if the Johnson proposals were successful, the American involvement in it would be 
sufficient for the US to be able to disengage from the problem.
 
380
Officially, the Johnson mission was not a US initiative. Joseph Johnson was sent to the 
Middle East as a PCC Special Representative. It was a UN initiative, orchestrated through the 
PCC, which was a UN commission. However, the United States had been the indisputable 
leader of the PCC since its beginning. From the US government’s point of view, President 
Kennedy’s contact with the Arab and Israeli heads of state in May 1961 was the origin of the 
Johnson initiative, and while Joseph Johnson was not formally associated with the US 
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government, he cooperated closely with them. The US government was briefed on Johnson’s 
findings before the rest of the PCC, and the Middle Eastern states all assumed that the US was 
closely invested in the project. This was necessary for them to take the initiative seriously, the 
Americans believed, while the UN framework was essential to “enhance the palatability of 
Johnson’s proposals.”381 This opinion was shared by Johnson himself, who believed the fact 
that he had connections within the US State Department without being too closely associated 
with it was crucial to the level of cooperation he had been able to get from the Middle Eastern 
heads of state.382
On 20 December 1962 the UN General Assembly again renewed the UNRWA 
mandate. Simultaneously, the PCC was thanked for its efforts to shift ground on the refugee 
question.
 It is tempting to ask whether the fact that the US sent a Presidential 
Emissary, one that offered a free carrot to one of the parties, disturbed the non-committal way 
the US was linked with the Johnson plan. In the end, the lack of the Middle Eastern states’ 
willingness to cooperate and a general lack of support for the Johnson plan was what brought 
it down.  
383 Despite the limited success of Joseph Johnson’s missions, the PCC was instructed 
by the General Assembly to continue with “its endeavours with the Member States directly 
concerned.”384 The Americans were pleased that the General Assembly had approved of 
Johnson and PCC’s work, and also that it had dismissed the regular attempts by Israel and its 
Arab neighbours of proposing unrealistic solutions to the conflict. The Americans considered 
the General Assembly’s disapproval of the “futile partisan proposals” almost equally useful as 
its endorsement of PCC’s “quiet diplomacy course” because this would reinforce any 
mediator’s attempt to make the Israelis and Arabs accept that no solution would be reached 
unless they gave up some of the more extreme conditions.385
Joseph Johnson resigned as PCC special representative on 31 January 1963.
 
386
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Bilateral Talks Post-Johnson Plan 
Following Joseph Johnson’s resignation in early 1963, the PCC was divided with regards to 
its further progress. The French believed Johnson’s proposals had resigned along with him, 
and the French government was not interested in making further efforts when the Israelis and 
Arabs were clearly far from reconciliation on the refugee issue.387 The government of France 
was interested in hearing what the Americans could achieve through bilateral talks with the 
Middle Eastern states as long as this did not require any commitment on the part of the PCC 
or France.388 However, the French were getting increasingly anxious what the US talks might 
lead to, and whether the American intention was to pressure the Israelis and Arabs to accept 
the Johnson plan. Thus Paris sent new instructions to its PCC member, Claude Arnaud, who 
was forced to return to the Americans with the new French position: France did not support 
any PCC action at all at this time, and the French government did not appreciate that the US 
was speaking on its behalf. Annoyed by the French change of heart, the US demanded to 
know what France proposed the PCC would tell the General Assembly if it did not follow up 
on the request to continue its diplomacy. To this, the French merely replied that they were not 
overly concerned with this problem.389
The third PCC member, Turkey, pointed out that the conditions in the Middle East 
were not the best, because of the situation among both the Arabs and the Israelis. The Arab 
states were divided due to the recent Iraqi revolution and domestic problems in Syria, among 
other things. According to Turkish Ambassador Menemencioglu, the Arab common strategy 
when facing internal divergence was to be uncompromising with regards to the Palestinian 
refugee problem. To ask them to reach some sort of understanding with Israel, and thus a de 
facto recognition of the Jewish state, would be futile at the time. Israel was worried that it 
would be forced to take large numbers of refugees. Because of these incompatible positions 
that Johnson’s missions had confirmed were still very present, the Turkish government did 
not think an active role by the PCC was wise at the time.
  
390
Despite the misgivings of its PCC partners, the US government was set on conducting 
high-level, bilateral talks with Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Syria.
   
391
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plan would not be fruitful, but the principles Johnson had coined through his missions could 
be used in further efforts. The American plan was to hold parallel, bilateral talks with the 
heads of state in Jerusalem and the Arab states, where the US would act as PCC’s “executive 
agent”.392 The Americans wanted to continue exploring what options the Middle Eastern 
states would be willing to accept to find a solution to the refugee problem. For this purpose 
the Arabs needed to be more specific about what they were willing to accept if Israel agreed 
to a certain amount of repatriation. Israel on its part needed to stop being adamant about 
refusing to accept the refugees’ right to return, as established in paragraph 11. The Americans 
wished to convey to them that they, like the General Assembly, thought it unrealistic of the 
Israelis to suggest that this paragraph should no longer apply.393
Because of the apprehension of the other PCC members, the Americans made a point 
of stating that while the US would be acting as a PCC member in the bilateral talks, the PCC 
was without commitment to the “nature or outcome of [the] talks.”
  
394
Determined to go on, but without PCC backing, the Americans scheduled the talks to 
commence that spring. Ben-Gurion appeared positive towards the attempts to achieve a 
solution, and according to the US representative he showed some flexibility in Israeli 
thinking, but he made no new suggestions himself. The Arab leaders were cordial and 
attentive, but they made no special comments.
 In retrospect it is 
pertinent to ask whether it was a wise move to set in motion another initiative with the same 
informal characteristics that helped bury the Johnson plan so soon after its demise.  
395 The general impression was that the Middle 
Eastern states still had too many preconditions for any joint efforts to be possible. The Israelis 
would have to be convinced that the points they demanded the Arabs accept before moving 
forward would be impossible to obtain. By the time of the second set of talks, the Americans 
were starting to realize that because of the conditions in the Middle East it might take some 
time before a solution could be reached. Further, the Americans had already established that 
despite its role in the quiet talks, the US was not interested in a role as honest broker.396
The American optimism was fading. The Arabs and Israelis had not altered their 
positions at all since the start of the bilateral talks, and the Americans were becoming 
impatient. They wanted to speed up the talks, and were beginning to demand preconditions of 
their own. The Americans were still reluctant to take on the role of middle man in any 
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potential negotiations, especially if the Israelis and Arabs were not willing to give their 
assurances that they would be willing to contribute to the solution of the refugee problem.397
Israel picked up the American apprehension, but failed to act on it. Instead the Israelis 
nearly managed to estrange the Americans in their eagerness to find a point of agreement. The 
American ambassador in Tel Aviv, Walworth Barbour, reported another US-Israeli 
disagreement after his third session with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and Foreign Minister 
Golda Meir. The Israeli leaders were eager to establish that the US agreed with them on 
certain Israeli-formulated principles, but without Barbour having given consent to this or 
without him having the authority to agree on behalf of the United States. Instead of securing 
an accord with Israel, then, Barbour was forced to clarify with the Israeli leaders that no such 
agreement was established.
 
398
Thus, when the United States UN delegation reported back to its PCC colleagues from 
France and Turkey, it was with a modest optimism. The bilateral talks had not yet reached a 
point where the Americans thought it fruitful to try to negotiate an agreement between the 
Middle Eastern states. The points the Americans stressed held warnings for both the Israelis 
and the Arabs: any future negotiations on the refugee issue could only take place with the 
understanding that Israel was a sovereign state whose security must be ensured, and that Israel 
could not talk its way out of the infamous paragraph 11 from the UN resolution 194.
  
399
In the Arabs the Americans detected hope that a solution could be found, and for the 
most part a realization that the majority of the refugees would not be repatriated but would 
have to be resettled. The critical point still seemed to be whether the Arabs could support a 
solution that somehow incorporated paragraph 11 without making it necessary for Israel to 
accept the principle.
 
400
The talks with Israel were more detailed. Israel promised cooperation if the Johnson 
plan was not pressed. Israel was also willing to consider a refugee settlement outside a general 
settlement if the guiding principle was “some repatriation, much resettlement”. However, 
Israel was still demanding some preconditions that most likely would be unacceptable to the 
Arabs.
   
401
When the PCC presented this to the UN, it had some unexpected results. In his token 
speech to the General Assembly, the UN Palestine Refugee Delegation chairman, Ahmed 
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Shukairy, derailed from the written text of his speech, turning it into a verbal attack on the 
PCC and its progress report.402 Shukairy said that the progress report should be called a 
“failure report” as no progress had been made. He criticized that the New York-based PCC 
was out of touch with the realities in the Middle East, and he believed the US “quiet talks” 
only served to fragment the PCC and thus undermine its power. He also objected to the talks 
being held “not with legal inhabitants of Palestine but with illegal Israeli invaders.”403
Shortly after this another setback came with other Arab reactions to the progress 
report. Jordan worried that the United States was abandoning paragraph 11 of the famous 
resolution 194. The American bilateral talks had been presented as talks without 
preconditions, in an attempt to sound out any new suggestions on either side. However, the 
Jordanians interpreted this as an indication that the Americans were looking to avoid the 
difficult paragraph as basis for a refugee settlement.
 
404 This suspicion was not entirely 
unfounded. The guiding principle the Americans had been going by in all their dealings with 
the refugee question was that any solution had to be a combination of repatriation and 
resettlement, which technically did not allow all refugees to choose to return to Israel if they 
wished, as the paragraph specified.405
Jordanian Foreign Minister Antone Atallah criticized the US for associating itself too 
closely with the PCC, and the PCC for delegating its tasks to one of its member states, He 
worried that the Americans were giving up on the refugee problem. He asked if the United 
States could reaffirm its support of paragraph 11. It was the Jordanian Foreign Minister’s 
belief that without such a reaffirmation, “the United States will be hurt with Arabs 
everywhere.”
  
406 To this Secretary Rusk replied that he was sorry the Americans could not 
agree with the Arabs in everything, but that he had confidence that the US position with 
regards to paragraph 11 could be clarified satisfactorily.407
But the turn of events in the following months was not beneficial for improved 
understanding between the US and the Arabs. First, the assassination of President Kennedy 
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made further advancement in the refugee problem uncertain since the President had invested 
so much of himself in the recent US efforts. Secondly, the new president, Lyndon B. Johnson, 
was perceived by many Arabs as pro-Israeli. This impression was strengthened by President 
Johnson’s speech to the Weizmann institute on 6 February 1964.408
In a briefing for President Johnson, Secretary Rusk expressed pessimism for any 
further progress on the refugee problem. He saw no way out of the Israeli categorical refusal 
of any repatriation. The best the US government could do was to try to preserve the status quo 
and continue convincing Congress of funding UNRWA.
 The view from the Arab 
world was that the United States was turning more towards Israel.  
409
In early 1964 the PCC found its task of responding to the General Assembly mandate 
of working towards paragraph 11 more difficult than ever. The Israeli refusal to comply was 
obvious. In addition the tension was high in the Middle East as a result of the crisis over the 
shared Jordan waters. And once again the PCC had internal disagreements. The French 
wanted to do nothing, while the Turkish wished for the PCC to accuse both Israelis and Arabs 
of lack of cooperation. The US delegation was not eager to make a stand at all, afraid that no 
matter what they did it would only make matters worse.
 
410 The end result was that no further 
direct PCC initiatives were attempted. Instead, the commission returned to its task of 
indentifying and evaluating refugee properties.411
Airlie House Discussions 
  
The summer of 1964 saw an attempt, initiated by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
and South Asian Affairs, Phillips Talbot, to broaden the perspective of the US administration 
on the Arab-Israeli problem. Talbot invited members of the State Department Bureau of Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA), along with certain key figures from other foreign 
policy agencies to a conference that he hoped would act as a “think-session” where the 
participants might come up with some ideas for what eventually could be worked out to 
guidelines for future policy decisions.412
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Talbot wanted to explore what the participants could imagine the US could expect with 
regards to the Arab-Israeli problem over the next two to five years, and he specified that he 
hoped they would search for constructive approaches and not just short-term tactics to prevent 
hostilities from breaking out.413
Of the topics discussed, the refugee problem got a lot of attention. In review of the 
recent US policy on the matter, the participants of the conference agreed that the refugee 
problem was a burden for the US, and that it ideally should disengage from the problem. The 
PCC membership was described as a liability and a farce, and even though certain dissenting 
voices indicated that US membership in the commission assured a certain level of control, the 
majority agreed that the PCC had no usefulness for the US in its current form. As NEA officer 
Lucien L. Kinsolving phrased it: It might be in the American “national interest to find another 
‘sucker’ for the unthankful mediation task.”
 
414 The participants of the conference also agreed 
once more to try to reduce the financial burden of UNRWA and place more responsibility of 
the refugees on the Arab host governments.415
Talbot’s intentions were commendable, but the Airlie House discussions hardly 
resulted in anything groundbreaking. The participants agreed that there were no prospects for 
any refugee initiatives in 1964 or 1965.
  
416 In the end, the conclusion of the conference was 
that “the continuation of an admittedly unsatisfactory status quo in the area is now as much in 
our national interest as a major initiative.”417
This principle continued to guide President Lyndon B. Johnson and his administration. 
The Johnson administration never made any serious attempts at solving the refugee problem. 
By the time the 1967 war created another 210 000 Palestinian refugees, Johnson was already 
too preoccupied with Vietnam to pay much attention to the Middle East.
 This was directly in opposition to the infamous 
paragraph 11, and to the PCC mandate.  
418
Lost Opportunities 
  
Approaching the Palestinian refugee problem between 1956 and 1967, the US failed to 
recognize the local and regional needs and wants. Israel, especially under Ben-Gurion and 
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Meir, was adamant about refusing any considerable refugee settlement within its borders. The 
Jewish state refused to approach the refugee question except within the framework of a larger 
settlement, and it skilfully avoided any opportunities for such an agreement. At the same time, 
the Arab states maintained a firm policy of refusing any official negotiations with Israel. The 
Arab states were also hesitant to accept the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees within 
their own borders, both because this was logistically difficult and because the refugee 
question continued to act as leverage for the Arab states in the larger Arab-Israeli conflict.  
The US government failed to acknowledge the full extent of this. In the end, the 
measures taken to approach the refugee problem were not efficient. They certainly did 
nothing to contribute to comprehensive peace.  
With the brief exception of the Kennedy initiatives between 1961 and 1963, the 
Americans showed a considerable desire to pull out from any responsibility in the Palestinian 
refugee problem between 1956 and 1967, but they were unable to do so. The refugee problem 
was initially considered key to solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, but instead it became one of 
the major obstacles to any solution. The overall impression is that the US government tried, 
but failed because of a combination of circumstantial difficulties and a hesitancy to become 
too involved. The US especially underestimated the Israeli lack of willingness to seek a 
compromise. They were outmanoeuvred in the Hawk talks, and they were not willing to exert 
any significant pressure out of fear of making matters worse.  
But why did the US keep trying to find a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem 
despite the many setbacks in this period? There seem to be three main reasons. First of all, the 
refugee problem was very persistent. The refugees continued to grow in numbers and they 
represented an unstable element in a region the Americans desperately wanted to keep calm. 
Secondly, the US commitments were considerable. With a membership in the PCC and the 
majority of the funding of UNRWA on its shoulders, disengagement was no easy task. The 
US tried to do so, but this continued to prove difficult. Finally, the Americans and many with 
them continued to believe that the refugee question was the key to solving the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In the absence of a permanent settlement for the refugees, there was little hope to 
shift any ground on any of the other outstanding questions in the conflict.  
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Conclusion 
In a memorandum for the Middle East task force on 29 May 1967, the US Under Secretary of 
State for Political Affairs, Eugene V. Rostow, declared that ”[f]or the moment, the chance of 
immediate Arab-Israeli hostilities has been reduced.”419
Simultaneously, the US approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the region in general 
changed. However, this thesis argues that this development started earlier. The US attempts to 
disengage from the Arab-Israeli conflict, to avoid engaging the Middle Eastern states in any 
comprehensive peace attempts and simultaneously keeping a hegemonic status in the region 
started with the 1956 war and continued throughout the period in question.  
 In retrospect it is apparent that he was 
terribly mistaken. It was only a matter of days before hostilities took on a new and unexpected 
brutality. The war in 1967 changed the political realities of the Middle East, as it firmly 
established Israel as the strongest military actor in the region. It has been considered a turning 
point for when US-Israeli relations took a new form from which it merged into the much 
discussed “special relationship”. As has been shown in this thesis, however, this is a truth 
with modifications. The development of the so-called US-Israeli special relationship started 
much earlier than 1967, but during the years prior to the 1967 war the relationship suffered 
certain blows as a result of either US disapproval of Israeli actions; Israeli disappointment 
with US policy; or a combination of both.  
Why Did the US Not Attempt to Solve the Conflict in the Middle East by 
Initiating a Comprehensive Peace Negotiation Between the 1956 and 
1967 Wars? 
Despite border incidents, water sharing problems, and the continued failure to achieve a 
permanent solution to the Palestinian refugee problem; the period between the wars in 1956 
and 1967 was relatively calm as far as the Middle East was concerned. The state of cold war 
                                                 
419 Rostow to the Middle East Task Force, 29 May 1967, Lot Files, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel 
Affairs, 1951-1976, box 26.  
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between the eastern and western blocks, between the different Arab countries, and between 
Israel and its Arab neighbors did not evolve into “hot” war during this period. Instead, these 
eleven years saw several tranquil phases, and in many ways it seemed like a suitable time to 
seek a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. US leaders had repeatedly exclaimed that 
the Middle East was important to them and that stability in the region was a top priority. A 
fundamental necessity to ensure stability in the Middle East was to secure lasting peace. Then 
why did they not?  
Part of the answer is that the United States was preoccupied with Cold War issues. 
Vietnam, Cuba, Berlin, among others. While the United States preferred peace in the Middle 
East, it gradually became more important to build alliances, to minimize American 
contribution and above all: to keep the Soviet Union out. The US governments were not 
willing to risk sacrificing Cold War aims for securing a long term solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict as long as short term stability appeared to rule.  
One should also consider, however, whether the US government had any real 
opportunity to act. All the initiatives the Americans were involved in during the late fifties 
and early sixties were plagued by the same problem: The Middle Eastern states were not 
willing to admit the concessions necessary to shift any ground in the problem. The conclusion 
reached time and again was that without sincere willingness from either side to cooperate on 
separate parts of the problem, there was little point of attempting to negotiate a 
comprehensive peace. The conclusion reached by Dulles and Eisenhower after they gave up 
on project Alpha in 1955, was repeated by the Americans in the years to come: the conflict 
was not ripe for negotiation.  
Instead of promoting negotiations that were assumed by the US government to fail, the 
Americans decided to try a piecemeal approach and wait for the conflict to become ripe. As it 
turned out, however, the US proved unable to convince the Middle Eastern states to cooperate 
even in those smaller initiatives. The Arab-Israeli conflict between 1956 and 1967 had several 
elements considered crucial for ripeness. There was a mutually hurting stalemate in the 
conflict since both Israel and the Arab states failed to accomplish their goals. Any unilateral 
approaches so far had proven unable to create peace or stability. The Arab states and Israel, as 
well as the potential mediator the US, theoretically sought peace, but each actor wanted it on 
their own terms. Thus they did not want comprehensive peace enough to sacrifice other 
interests.  
The uncompromising attitudes of the actors involved in the conflict makes it 
understandable that the US government found it difficult to introduce any comprehensive 
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peace attempts. Since the previous US attempts to make the Middle Eastern states reach 
common ground had failed, it is not surprising that the Americans did not consider the 
conflict ripe negotiation. However, it must be questioned whether the US choice of 
abandoning any attempts at comprehensive peace also had something to do with willingness. 
The American policy in the Middle East – as everywhere else – was ruled by US national 
interests. If peacemaking was not seen as consistent with these interests, the willingness to 
become involved in the conflict was obviously reduced. Between 1956 and 1967 the main 
American foreign policy goal was to contain the Soviet Union. It was considered a vital 
national interest to maintain US hegemony in the Middle East. Peacemaking would only have 
US approval for as long as was consistent with this policy.  
At the same time, the domestic political situation in the US limited the options for the 
US government. Traditionally Israel-friendly fractions were outraged, and very loudly so, 
whenever the US administrations attempted to act in any way that would not benefit the 
Jewish state. The 1953 outcry after the US sanctions towards Israel as a result of the 
construction in the Syro-Israeli Demilitarized Zone is an example of how difficult it was to 
apply any sort of pressure on Israel. Similarly, the caution the US administrations had to take 
when they were nearing an election illustrates how the US domestic political climate affected 
foreign policy issues.  
Changing the US role in the Middle East  
After several failed comprehensive peace attempts before the 1956 war, the US government 
was reluctant to promote any further efforts. With the changed political balance in the Middle 
East after the 1956 war, it became more pressing for the Eisenhower administration to find the 
proper role for the US in the region than it was to promote peace. The top priorities for the US 
government were to re-establish close contact with its European allies after the Suez-fallout 
and forming closer ties with the Middle Eastern states – all in the context of keeping the 
Soviet Union out of the region. Unfortunately, it was impossible to simultaneously satisfy the 
needs of Israel and the Arab states. The attempts of the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations to lead a balanced policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict both failed to 
appease the local states. Eventually the US policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict caused a 
polarization of US relations in the region, where friendly relations and close cooperation with 
Israel and a few selected Arab states caused friction and tension between the US and the 
remaining Arab states, such as Egypt and Syria.  
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As a means of firmly establishing the new US role in a region traditionally dominated 
by Britain, Eisenhower chose to rely on bilateral rather than multilateral approaches. Through 
the refusal of joining any regional organizations and the subsequent announcement of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, the President assured the Middle Eastern countries once and for all that 
they were either with the US or against it. The message to the Soviet Union was also clear: the 
US was not willing to give an inch in the Middle East.  
Treating Symptoms Rather Than the Cause  
Because of its reluctance to invest any further effort into any comprehensive peace initiatives, 
in the period 1956-1967 the US administrations attempted several smaller initiatives directed 
at individually identifiable problems within the larger conflict. The continued attempts at 
achieving technical agreement on several water sharing schemes, and the Johnson mission for 
solving the Palestine refugee problem are examples of such initiatives. The intention and hope 
was that if some level of agreement could be reached in these separate issues, there could 
eventually be cooperation between the Middle Eastern states in making progress towards 
peace in the overall conflict.  
These initiatives ran into several problems. First of all, none of the issues addressed 
could be entirely separated from the overall conflict. The Middle Eastern states’ reluctance to 
cooperate to achieve overall peace also applied to the individual issues. Cooperation in 
piecemeal approaches proved as difficult as cooperation in the comprehensive initiatives of 
the past.  
Secondly, several of the initiatives had fundamental problems that made them 
unsuitable for the realities in the conflict. The US insistence of maintaining Eric Johnston’s 
plan for water sharing as a “yardstick” for years after it had been rejected by the Middle 
Eastern states was unfortunate. However, what eventually made it completely impossible to 
function as the US policymakers had intended, was the fact that the Jordan River riparian 
states and the US had different perceptions of what the plan entailed.  
Similarly, the PCC initiative for refugees failed to take into account the political 
realities in the Middle East. Joseph Johnson was not able to convince Israel of repatriation or 
the Arab states of resettlement, and thus his work had no practical effect for the Palestinian 
refugee problem. The US continuation of the approach even after Johnson resigned, despite 
the obvious lack of cooperation from the Middle Eastern states, illustrates the discrepancy 
between how the US perceived the conflict and how it really was.  
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Finally, the US approach was conflicting and confusing for the Middle Eastern states, 
as illustrated by their continued demands for clarifications of the US policy. The US wanted 
an unbiased approach, but often favoured Israel. The American goal was to maintain US 
hegemony and to keep the Soviet Union out of the Middle East, but simultaneously the US 
governments hesitated to get too involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The piecemeal 
initiatives were attempts at uniting these conflicting interests, but the result was that the US 
managed to get more biased, more involved and their initiatives never actually solved 
anything. By the time Lyndon B. Johnson took office, the foundation was already made for 
the bias towards Israel, the disengagement from any peace initiatives, and a reduced 
willingness to act tough when the Middle East again erupted in war in 1967.  
Lack of Will or Forced by Circumstances?  
In the end, there are several reasons why the US failed to create comprehensive peace in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict between 1956 and 1967. It boils down to a question of whether the lack 
of US peace initiatives was a conscious decision to avoid engagement because this was in 
conflict with US interests; or if it was the circumstances that prevented such an initiative even 
if the US policy makers wanted it.  
The answer is that the failure was a result of a combination of the two. There is no 
doubt that peace, or at the very least stability, in the Middle East was considered important by 
all the three examined administrations. However, the means to reach such stability, and the 
definition of what it needed to include, differed significantly.  
Eisenhower favoured stability – preferably through the means of a comprehensive 
peace agreement the states could be held accountable to – because he saw lack of peace in the 
Middle East as a serious threat to US interests there. The fear of letting the Soviet Union gain 
ground in the Middle East continuously defined the Eisenhower administration’s Middle East 
policy. However, Eisenhower’s efforts to create peace failed, and eventually his belief in the 
possibility of achieving it was reduced to nothing.  
Kennedy’s administration started out with a more active approach. Kennedy tried to 
create a productive relationship with several of the heads of state in the Middle East. During 
his presidency there were also made attempts in the fields of water cooperation and the 
refugee issue. However, several additional US policy changes, such as selling arms to Israel 
and turning a blind eye to the development of the Dimona nuclear reactor did not have a 
fortunate effect on the conflict. Further, two of the initiatives given particular attention in this 
thesis, the post-Suez usage of the Eric Johnston plan and the Joseph Johnson PCC mission, 
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did not in any way help the creation of comprehensive peace. Due to Kennedy’s premature 
death it is difficult to evaluate the consequences of his policies. He might have accomplished 
more in a second term, as is often the case because US presidents tend to take electoral 
considerations during their first term.  
Lyndon B. Johnson’s abrupt entry into his first presidential period after Kennedy’s 
assassination was followed by a short phase where he seemingly did not change the US policy 
towards the Middle East considerably. In the following years, however, the Johnson 
administration’s polarization of the US approach to the Middle Eastern states was what once 
and for all settled the US-Israeli special relationship, with all the implications this had for the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. No comprehensive peace initiatives came about in Johnson’s 
presidency, and under him the US government spectacularly failed to prevent the clash 
between Israel and its Arab neighbours in 1967. In Johnson’s case, however, there also 
appears to have been a significant “force of circumstances” determining his position. He was 
not interested in promoting comprehensive peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, 
Johnson was rather preoccupied with dealing with larger issues in the contemporary domestic 
and international politics of the US, such as Vietnam and the Civil Rights Movement. Thus 
Johnson is perhaps the one of the three presidents who had the least opportunity to launch any 
major initiatives in the Middle East.  
The conditions were not ripe for comprehensive peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict in 
1956. They were not ripe in 1961 when Kennedy became president, and they were not ripe in 
1963 when Johnson moved into the White House. They were certainly not ripe in 1967 when 
the Americans seemed unaware of how close a third Arab-Israeli war was. But the Arab-
Israeli conflict does not appear to ever become ripe. A suggestion for further research might 
be to examine the American decision makers’ belief in lack of ripeness of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, compared to their willingness to try to reach a solution. If the US governments 
between 1956 and 1967 were to have had a hand in achieving comprehensive peace in the 
Middle East, they would have had to give it a try before deciding they failed.  
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